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Abstract
We initiate the study of computational entropy in the quantum setting. We investigate to
what extent the classical notions of computational entropy generalize to the quantum setting,
and whether quantum analogues of classical theorems hold. Our main results are as follows.
(1) The classical Leakage Chain Rule for pseudoentropy can be extended to the case that the
leakage information is quantum (while the source remains classical). Specifically, if the source
has pseudoentropy at least k, then it has pseudoentropy at least k − ℓ conditioned on an ℓ-
qubit leakage. (2) As an application of the Leakage Chain Rule, we construct the first quantum
leakage-resilient stream-cipher in the bounded-quantum-storage model, assuming the existence
of a quantum-secure pseudorandom generator. (3) We show that the general form of the classical
Dense Model Theorem (interpreted as the equivalence between two definitions of pseudo-relative-
min-entropy) does not extend to quantum states. Along the way, we develop quantum analogues
of some classical techniques (e.g., the Leakage Simulation Lemma, which is proven by a Non-
uniform Min-Max Theorem or Boosting). On the other hand, we also identify some classical
techniques (e.g., Gap Amplification) that do not work in the quantum setting. Moreover, we
introduce a variety of notions that combine quantum information and quantum complexity, and
this raises several directions for future work.
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1 Introduction
Computational notions of entropy have many applications in cryptography and complexity theory.
These notions measure how much (min-)entropy a source X has from the eyes of a computationally
bounded party who may hold certain “leakage information” B that is correlated with X. They
have several applications in cryptography, such as leakage-resilient cryptography [DP08], memory
delegation [CKLR11], deterministic encryption [FOR12], zero-knowledge [CLP15], pseudorandom
generators [HILL99] and other cryptographic primitives [HRVW09], and also have close connections
to important results in complexity theory, such as Impagliazzo’s hardcore lemma [Imp95], and in
additive number theory, such as the Dense Model Theorem [GT08, TZ08, RTTV08].
In this work, we initiate the study of computational entropy in the quantum setting, where
X and B may become quantum states and the computationally bounded observer is modeled as
a small quantum circuit. We find that some classical phenomena have (nontrivial) extensions to
the quantum setting, but for others, the quantum setting behaves quite differently and we can
even prove that the natural analogues of classical theorems are false. As an application of some
of our results, we construct a quantum leakage-resilient stream-cipher in the bounded-quantum-
storage model, assuming the existence of a quantum-secure pseudorandom generator. We expect
that computational notions of quantum entropy will find other natural applications in quantum
cryptography. Moreover, by blending quantum information theory and quantum complexity theory,
our study may provide new insights and perspectives in both of these areas.
In the rest of the introduction, we give a high-level overview of our work, highlight some of our
interesting findings. sec:quantum-indistinguishability.
1.1 Brief Review of Quantum Information and Computation
Recall that a pure state in an n-qubit quantum system is a unit vector |ψ〉 ∈ C2n . The standard
(“computational”) basis is denoted by {|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n} and represents the set of classical bit
strings x ∈ {0, 1}n. Until they are measured (observed), quantum systems evolve via unitary
operations (2n × 2n complex matrices U such that UU † = I, where U † is the conjugate transpose).
A projective binary measurement on the quantum system is given by a linear subspace A ⊆ C2n .
If the system is in state |ψ〉 ∈ C2n , then the result of the measurement is determined by the
decomposition |ψ〉 = |ψ〉A + |ψ〉A⊥ , where |ψ〉A is the orthogonal projection of |ψ〉 to A. With
probability ‖ |ψ〉A ‖22, the measurement returns 1 and the system collapses to state |ψ〉A /‖ |ψ〉A ‖2,
and with probability ‖ |ψ〉A⊥ ‖22, the measurement returns 0 and the system collapses to state
|ψ〉A⊥ /‖ |ψ〉A⊥ ‖2. We abuse notation and write A(|ψ〉) to denote the {0, 1} random variable
that is the outcome of the measurement. There is a more general form of binary measurement
(described by a “projective operator value measurement” (POVM)), but we only need a projective
binary measurement to discuss most concepts in the introduction, and defer the definition of POVM
to where we need it.
Amixed state ρ of a quantum system can be specified by a probability distribution {pi} over pure
states {|ψi〉}. If we evolve ρ by applying a unitary transformation U , it will be in the mixed state
given by distribution {pi} over the pure states {U |ψi〉}. If instead we perform a measurement A on
such a mixed state ρ, then, by definition, Pr[A(ρ) = 1] =
∑
i pi ·Pr[A(|ψi〉) = 1] =
∑
i pi · ‖ |ψi〉A ‖22.
The representation of a mixed state as a probability distribution over pure states is not unique, in
that two such representations can yield exactly the same behavior under all sequences of unitary
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transformations and measurements.1 For example, the maximally mixed state σmix is defined as the
uniform distribution over the standard classical basis {|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n}, but using any orthonormal
basis of C2
n
yields an equivalent mixed state (and thus all of them are regarded as the same mixed
state σmix).
Recall that the min-entropy of a classical random variable X is given by
Hmin(X) = min
x
log(1/Pr[X = x]) =
1
log (maxx Pr[Ax(X) = 1])
,
where Ax is the indicator function for x. When we have a mixed quantum state ρX instead of
a classical random variable X, we generalize from indicator functions to one-dimensional binary
measurements [Ren05]. That is, if ρX is a mixed quantum state, then:
Hmin(X)ρ =
1
log
(
max|ψ〉 Pr
[
A|ψ〉(ρ) = 1
]) ,
where A|ψ〉 is the binary measurement given by the one-dimensional subspace spanned by |ψ〉.
This generalizes the classical definition. If ρ is given by a distribution {px} over the classical basis
{|x〉}, then the maximum value of Pr[A|ψ〉(ρ) = 1] =
∑
x px| 〈ψ|x〉 |2 is maxx px, obtained by taking
|ψ〉 = |y〉 for y = argmaxxpx. On the other hand, if ρ is a pure state, with all of its probability on
a single unit vector |φ〉, then the maximum probability is 1 (yielding zero min-entropy), obtained
by taking ψ = φ.
Informally, a quantum circuit computes on a quantum state (which may be a classical input
|x〉 for x ∈ {0, 1}n) by applying a sequence of local gates, which are unitary transformations and
measurements that apply to only a constant number of qubits in the state. Quantum circuits are
also allowed extra ancilla qubits (in addition to the n input qubits). We usually require those
ancilla bits are initialized to be |0n〉. The size of a quantum circuit is the number of gates.
1.2 Quantum Computational Notions
Quantum Indistinguishability. In many applications of cryptography and complexity theory,
we only require the security against adversaries with restricted power. One of the most common re-
strictions is considering only polynomial time bounded circuits/algorithms. Certainly, “polynomial
time” is meaningful only when we consider an ensemble of inputs and circuits.
In the classical world, there are two different computational models that are widely studied.
First, in the nonuniform computation model, circuits can depend on the input size, while in the
uniform computation model, the same algorithm is used for inputs of any size, or equivalently,
there is an algorithm that can generate the ensemble of circuits. Once the universal gate set is
fixed, we can define the size of a circuit. Then both models can be extended to the quantum
setting naturally by replacing circuits with quantum circuits. In this article, we mostly focus on
the nonuniform settings, as adversaries have more power in this model. Consider two quantum
state ensembles {ρn} and {σn} where n bounds the number of qubits in ρn and σn and serves as
the security parameter. We say {ρn} and {σn} are quantum-indistinguishable if for every poly(n)-
size nonuniform quantum algorithm {An}, we have |Pr[An(ρn) = 1] − Pr[An(σn) = 1]| ≤ negl(n).
Sometimes, we consider the asymptotic setting implicitly by omitting the index n.
1A unique representation of a mixed state is given by its density matrix
∑
i pi |ψi〉〈ψi|, which is a 2
n × 2n positive
semidefinite matrix of trace one, and thus we use the density matrix formalism in the technical sections of the paper.
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Classically, an equivalent way to define a nonuniform circuit ensemble is giving a uniform algo-
rithm (e.g., a Turing machine) advice strings which only depend on input lengths. In the quantum
setting, this formation of uniform algorithms with advice matches the above definition of nonuni-
form quantum circuits if we restrict the advice strings to be classical. But one can consider an
even more general computational model by giving the circuits quantum advice. A simple way to
incorporate quantum advice is to allow the quantum circuits have some of ancilla bits initialized
to be the quantum advice. In this model, the quantum analogue of the classical complexity class
P/poly is BQP/qpoly, which was defined by Nishimura and Yamakami [NY04]. An intriguing
and well known question is whether quantum advice provides more power in computation? i.e., does
BQP/qpoly = BQP/poly (and whether QMA = QCMA). One can also define the indistin-
guishability with quantum advice. Some of our results hold in this model as well. For the sake of
simplicity, in the rest of the introduction, we only consider classical advice when it is not specified
explicitly.
Pseudorandom States. In the classical setting, a distribution Xn over {0, 1}n is pseudorandom
if X is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution Un. Namely, for every
probabilistic poly(κ)-size circuitD, the distinguishing advantage ofD is negligible, i.e., |Pr[D(X) =
1] − Pr[D(Un) = 1]| ≤ negl(κ), where κ is a security parameter. That X is pseudorandom means
X has full n bits of computational entropy. Pseudorandomness is a fundamental notion pervasive
in cryptography.
In the quantum setting, the classical uniform distribution is represented as the maximally
mixed state σmix, as defined earlier. Thus, the notion of pseudorandomness generalizes naturally:
a mixed quantum state ρ is pseudorandom if it is computationally indistinguishable from σmix
to quantum distinguishers. That is, for every poly(κ)-size quantum circuit D, |Pr[D(ρ) = 1] −
Pr[D(σmix) = 1]| ≤ negl(κ). We note that pseudorandomness of classical distributions against
quantum distinguishers has been studied extensively in the context of post-quantum cryptography
(e.g., [Son14] and references therein). The difference here is that we consider pseudorandomness
for quantum states.
An interesting observation is that there exist pure states that are pseudorandom, due to Brem-
ner, Mora and Winter [BMW09], and Gross, Flammia and Eisert [GFE09]. In [BMW09], the
existence of a pseudorandom pure state was viewed as a negative result, showing that random pure
states are not useful for efficient quantum computation, since they can be replaced by uniform
classical bits. However, from the perspective of pseudorandomness and computational entropy, it
is a positive result, asserting the existence of a pseudorandom state that has zero entropy (as pure
states have zero entropy). This is a sharp contrast from the classical setting, where a classical
distribution needs min-entropy at least ω(log n) to be pseudorandom. Indeed, the existence of
pseudorandom pure states reveals a sharp contrast between the quantum setting and the classical
setting: it says that a quantum state with zero entropy (i.e., a pure state) can be pseudorandom,
whereas a classical distribution needs min-entropy at least ω(log n) to be pseudorandom. We re-
mark that this separation relies on our choice to consider quantum distinguisher with only classical
advice. (If we allow quantum advice, it is an interesting open problem to determine the existence
of a pseudorandom state of entropy o(n))
As discussed in Section 1.6 below, we use the existence of pseudorandom pure states to show the
separation of two classically equivalent notions of “computational relative entropy” in the quantum
world.
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Computational Quantum (Min-)Entropy We next investigate computational notions of en-
tropy in the quantum setting. One of the most natural ways to define the computational min-
entropy is that we say a state has computational min-entropy at least k if it is indistinguishable
(by poly-size quantum circuits) from a state with entropy at least k. If k equals the number of
qubits of the state, then this is simply the definition of pseudorandomness described above, as the
maximally mixed state is the unique state of (min-)entropy k.
In the classical settings, this definition was first proposed by H˚astad, Impagliazzo, Levin and
Luby [HILL99], constructing a pseudorandom generator from any one-way function. There are a
number of other ways to define computational min-entropy with many different applications and
interesting connections to other fields. In Section 4, we give a systematic overview of classical
definitions and known relations among them and discuss quantum analogues of these definitions
and our findings.
In the rest of introduction, we focus on the HILL-style computational entropy definitions, which
are the most widely used notions in the classical setting. Under this notion, we prove the quantum
analogues of the “Leakage Chain Rule for HILL pseudoentropy” which has cryptographic applica-
tions. There remain many interesting open problems about understanding and relating quantum
analogues of other definitions of pseudoentropy.
1.3 Leakage Chain Rule
Conditional Min-Entropy. Many applications require measures of conditional entropyH(X|B),
where B often represents some leakage about X. A popular and useful measure of conditional min-
entropy in the classical setting is the notion of average min-entropy by [DORS08], which has a nice
operational meaning in terms of the guessing probability: Let (X,B) be a joint distribution over
{0, 1}n+ℓ. The guessing probability of X conditioned on B is defined as the maximum probability
that an algorithm can guess X correctly given B. That is, P guess(X|B) def= maxA Pr[A(B) = X],
where the maximum is taken over all (even computationally unbounded) algorithms A. Then the
conditional min-entropy (as known as average min-entropy) ofX given B is defined as Hmin(X|B) =
− log(P guess(X|B)).
The definition of conditional min-entropy H(X|B)ρ for bipartite quantum states ρXB was given
by [Ren05], which generalizes the aforementioned definition of average min-entropy as well as our
earlier definition for (non-conditional) min-entropy of quantum states (in Section 1.1). A natural
way to generalize the guessing game is, given B, the guesser apply a POVM indexed by a vector
|ψ〉, then do the binary measurement on X part given by the one-dimensional subspace spanned
by |ψ〉. Then the guessing probability is the probability of getting 1. For the special case of
classical X and quantum B, which is called a classical-quantum-state (cq-state), Ko¨nig, Renner
and Schaffner proved the generalized guessing game described above captures the conditional min-
entropy definition [KRS09]. When two parts are quantum (a qq-state), the guessing probability may
give higher entropy then Renner’s definition. (Instead, an operational interpretation of Renner’s
definition is as the maximum achievable singlet fraction [KRS09].) In fact, when ρXB is entangled,
the conditional min-entropy can be negative, which is impossible to be captured by a guessing
probability.
The cq-state case is particularly useful in quantum cryptography, such as quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) [BB84, Ren05, VV14], device-independent cryptography [VV12, MS14, CSW14], and
quantum-proof randomness extractors [DPVR12]. Also it has a more natural operational interpre-
tation. Thus, we focus on conditional min-entropy for cq-states in this paper, and leave the study
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of conditional min-entropy for qq-states and computational analogues for future work.
Conditional Pseudoentropy. Classically, for a joint distribution (X,B), we say that X condi-
tioned on B has conditional relaxed HILL pseudo(min-)entropy at least k if there exists a distribu-
tion (X ′, B′) that is computationally indistinguishable from (X,B) with Hmin(X ′|B′) ≥ k. (This
definition is called relaxed HILL pseudoentropy because we do not require that B′ is identically
distributed to B. For short, we will write rHILL to indicate that we are working with the relaxed
definition.)
In the quantum setting, let ρXB ∈ X⊗B be a bipartite cq-state with n+ℓ qubits. We say that X
conditioned on B has conditional quantum rHILL pseudo(min-)entropy at least k (informally writ-
ten as H rHILL(X|B)ρ ≥ k) if there exists a quantum state σXB such that (i) Hmin(X|B)σ ≥ k and
(ii) ρXB and σXB are computationally indistinguishable by all poly(κ)-size quantum distinguishers,
where again κ is the security parameter.
Leakage Chain Rule for quantum HILL pseudoentropy. The classical Leakage Chain Rule
for rHILL pseudoentropy, first proved by [DP08, RTTV08] and improved by [FR12, Sko13], states
that for a joint distribution (X,Z,B) where B consists of ℓ = O(log κ) bits,
H rHILL(X|Z) ≥ k ⇒ H rHILL(X|Z,B) ≥ k − ℓ.
(Note that under standard cryptographic assumptions, the analogous statement for (standard)
HILL pseudoentropy is false [KPW13].) The leakage chain rule is an important property for pseu-
doentropy and has a number of applications in cryptography, such as leakage-resilient cryptogra-
phy [DP08], memory delegation [CKLR11], and deterministic encryption [FOR15].
In this paper, we prove that this Leakage Chain Rule can be generalized to handle quantum
leakage B when both the source X and the prior leakage Z remain classical.
Theorem 1.1 (Quantum Leakage Chain Rule; informal). Let ρXZB be a ccq-state, where X and Z
are classical and B consists of ℓ qubits, for ℓ = O(log κ), where κ is the security parameter. Then
H rHILL(X|Z)ρ ≥ k ⇒ H rHILL(X|Z,B)ρ ≥ k − ℓ.
Theorem 1.1 is proved by a quantum generalization of the Leakage Simulation Lemma [TTV09,
JP14, CLP15, VZ13] to its quantum analogue (which implies Theorem 1.1 immediately). There
are two types of classical proofs for the Leakage Simulation Lemma: one based on Boosting and
one based on the Min-Max Theorem. We develop quantum analogues of both proofs. We will
demonstrate the boosting proof in Section 6.2, and leave the min-max proof in Appendix B as it
is more involved. Both proofs also rely on efficient algorithms for quantum tasks such as POVM
tomography and quantum circuit synthesis to construct efficient reductions. This leads to a variant
of POVM tomography problem that merits further study.
An interesting open question is to prove the leakage chain rule when the source X and/or the
prior leakage Z are quantum. In particular, handling a prior quantum leakage Z seems important
for applications to leakage-resilient cryptography with quantum leakage. This is not likely to be
a direct generalization of Theorem 1.1 as even the information theoretic leakage chain rule loses
2ℓ [WTHR11] rather than ℓ bits of entropy. We leave an investigation of computational analogues
of this Leakage Chain Rule to future work. In Section 1.7, we discuss a general barrier to further
generalizing our proof to handling quantum X and Z as well as to generalizing many other proofs
of classical theorems.
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1.4 Main Techniques
We first review a common technique for proving some classical theorems about indistinguishability
and computational entropy (e.g., Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Lemma [Imp95], Regularity Lemma [TTV09]
and Dense Model Theorem [RTTV08]). In those proofs, there is usually a step of “switching quan-
tifiers”, and that is a place where the min-max theorem comes in. For instance, one wants to prove
that X not having high HILL entropy against s-size circuits implies X does not having high metric
entropy [BSW03]. From the assumption, we know for all distributions Y with high min-entropy,
there exists an s-size circuit to distinguish X and Y . We view it as a game between Player 1 who
provides a distribution, and Player 2 who provides a distinguisher, so Player 2 always has a certain
payoff by the assumption. Then by von Neumann’s Min-Max Theorem, Player 2 has a universal
“mixed strategy,” which is a distribution over distinguishers that achieves high payoff for every
distribution from Player 1’s strategy. It turns out that this statement almost gives us the desired
conclusion, except we only got a distribution over s-size distinguishers instead of a small size distin-
guisher. One common remedy is a “sampling”. If we sample polynomially many distinguishers from
the distribution over distinguishers, then by a Chernoff bound, with high probability, the average
of the sampled distinguishers performs well for any fixed x in Player 1’s strategy space. Then by
a union bound, the samples work well for all x. Therefore, we can obtain a universal distinguisher
with complexity roughly s times the (polynomial) number of samples we need.
Suppose we would like to generalize the above statement to the quantum settings, in which a
strategy of Player 1 is a quantum state rather than a classical distribution. An immediate obstacle
is that we cannot union bound over all possible pure states. A naive approach is to union bound
over an “ε-net” of all possible pure states. In this way, one can still obtain a nonuniform min-max
theorem. However, since the net is doubly exponentially large (c.f. Proposition B.1), the complexity
of the universal circuit is too large for some applications. Therefore, another view of the min-max
theorem that generalizes to the quantum setting better is desired.
Freund and Schapire [FS99] showed how to use the multiplicative weight update (MWU) method
to prove von Neumann’s Min-Max Theorem. Moreover, the proof provides a constructive way to
approximate the universal strategy. Inspired by Barak Hardt and Kale [BHK09], Vadhan and
Zheng [VZ13] adopted the framework to show a uniform min-max theorem. Contrary to the above
sampling method, which can only show the existence of the low complexity universal strategy, the
uniform version provides an efficient way to find a universal strategy. As applications, they proved
some aforementioned theorems (e.g., Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Lemma and Dense Model Theorem)
with uniform security using the uniform min-max theorem. From this perspective of MWU, a
(mixed) strategy of Player 1 is viewed as a weight vector. During the MWU procedure, we maintain
the weight vectors over the support of X. In each round, we update the weight vector according to
some loss function. In an extension to the quantum setting, the Player 1’s strategy is a quantum
state, which can be represented as a density matrix. Luckily, there is a generalization of MWU,
called the matrix multiplicative update (MMWU) method [Kal07]. In an MMWU procedure,
instead of maintaining a weight vector, we keep updating a weight matrix, which is semidefinite
positive. The weight matrix can be seen as a quantum state in Player 1’s strategy space as long as
it is Hermitian. In this work, we prove the quantum min-max theorem via MMWU and then are
able to apply it to connect different pseudoentropy notions and the Quantum Leakage Chain Rule.
In [VZ13], the purpose of using the MWU approach was to obtain a constructive version of
the min-max theorem. Since we use a similar argument in the quantum setting, in fact, we can
also have a uniform version of the quantum min-max theorem. However, we have not found any
further applications of the constructive version, so we still only state it as the quantum nonuniform
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min-max theorem for simplicity.
1.5 Application to Quantum Leakage-Resilient Stream-Ciphers
In this section, we demonstrate an application of computational quantum entropy to leakage-
resilient cryptography, where we seek to construct cryptographic protocols that maintain the secu-
rity even if the side information about the honest parties’ secrets leaks to an adversary. Specifically,
we construct a leakage-resilient stream-cipher that is secure against quantum leakage.
Classical leakage-resilient stream-ciphers were investigated in the seminal work of Dziembowski
and Pietrzak [DP08], where they consider the security of a stream-cipher SC in the “only com-
putation leaks” model [MR04] with continual leakage. Specifically, let Si denote the secret state
of SC. At each round i when the stream cipher evaluates (Si+1,Xi+1) = SC(Si), an adversary
can adaptively choose any leakage function fi and learn the output of fi applied to the part of Si
involved in the computation of SC(Si). They assume that the leakage functions are efficient and
of bounded output length ℓ = O(log κ),2 and proved the security property: the output of the i-th
round remains pseudorandom given the output and leakage of the first i − 1 rounds. Note that
even though the length of each leakage is bounded, in total the adversary can collect a long leakage
accumulated over many rounds.
Dziembowski and Pietrzak [DP08] gave the first construction of a leakage-resilient stream-
cipher based on randomness extractors and pseudorandom generators (PRGs), and proved the
security using the classical Leakage Chain Rule for HILL pseudoentropy. Pietrzak [Pie09] gave a
simpler construction based on any weak pseudorandom functions (weak PRFs), and Jetchev and
Pietrzak [JP14] gave an improved analysis of [Pie09] using the classical Leakage Simulation Lemma.
Now we consider the case that the leakage is quantum (while the stream-cipher remains clas-
sical). Namely, the output of the leakage functions is a bounded-length quantum state. It is
conceivable that such an attack may exist in the future with the emergence of quantum comput-
ers. We also view this as a natural theoretical question that investigates problem information
through a cryptographic lens. We show that the construction of Dziembowski and Pietrzak [DP08]
remains secure against quantum leakage in the bounded-quantum-storage model [DFSS05, KT08,
WW08, Unr11], where the adversary has a limited quantum memory (but no restriction on its
classical memory. The model is investigated in the literature as a way to bypass impossibility
results [DFSS05, WW08, Unr11] or to prove security [KT08].
Theorem 1.2 (Quantum Leakage-Resilient Stream-Cipher; informal). Assuming the existence of
quantum-secure pseudorandom generators against quantum distinguisher with quantum advice, there
exists quantum leakage-resilient stream-cipher secure against bounded-quantum-storage adversaries
with O(log κ) quantum memory and poly(κ) circuit size, where κ is the security parameter.
Note that both bounds on the leakage and quantum storage are logarithmic in the security of
the underlying primitives. If the PRG has exponential security, then the leakage and adversary’s
quantum storage can be linear in the size of the secret state.
When proving the quantum security of classical cryptographic constructions (e.g., construction
of PRGs), it often suffices to assume quantum security of the underlying primitives (e.g., one-
way functions or lattice assumptions), since typically the security reductions are “nice” and can
2Note that both assumptions are necessary. Without the efficiency assumption, the leakage function can invert
the secret state and leak on the initial secret S0 bit by bit. Without the length bound, the adversary can learn the
entire new secret state.
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be directly carried through in the quantum setting. (See the work of Song [Son14] for a nice
framework formalizing this observation.) However, this is not the case here due to the presence
of quantum information.3 Several issues arise when we generalize the classical proofs to handle
quantum leakage. We provide detailed discussion on the issues we encounter in Section 7, and here
we only explain where the bounded-quantum-storage limitation comes from.
The classical proof of the security iteratively argues that the secret state Si of the stream-
cipher remains pseudorandom to the adversary. When the adversary leaks up to O(log κ) bits on
Si, the Leakage Chain Rule for HILL pseudoentropy says that Si retains high HILL pseudoentropy
given the adversary’s view. Thus, if the stream-cipher applies an extractor and a PRG, Si can be
replaced with a new state Si+1 that is pseudorandom (while also generating some pseudorandom
output bits for the stream-cipher). The same argument works for a single round of leakage in the
quantum setting using our Leakage Lemma for Quantum HILL Pseudoentropy (Theorem 1.1. But
over many rounds, the adversary can accumulate long quantum auxiliary information Z, and we do
not know how to prove the leakage lemma in such a case. (The lemma does hold if Z is classical.)
Assuming bounded quantum storage prevents this accumulation (but still allows the accumulation
of classical leakage information). Our proof formally proceeds by using our Quantum Leakage
Simulation Lemma to efficiently simulate the adversary’s quantum state at each round. We leave it
as an interesting open question to identify versions of Leakage Chain Rule or Leakage Simulation
Lemma that are sufficient to prove the security of quantum leakage-resilient stream-cipher against
a general adversary.
1.6 The Dense Model Theorem and Computational Relative Min-Entropy
First, we review the two possible definitions of computational relative entropy in the classical
case. Let X and Y be two distributions. The relative min-entropy from X to Y is defined
as maxx∈Supp(X) log(Pr [X = x] /Pr [Y = x]). That is, D(X‖Y ) ≤ λ iff X is 2−λ-dense in Y .
i.e., Pr [Y = x] ≥ 2−λ Pr [X = x] for all x. And if X is distributed over n-bit strings, then
D(X‖Un) ≤ λ iff Hmin(X) ≥ n − λ. We say the HILL-1 relative min-entropy from X to Y is
at most λ (informally written as DHILL-1(X‖Y ) ≤ λ) if there exists a distribution X ′ computation-
ally indistinguishable from X such that D∞(X ′‖Y ) ≤ λ. We say that HILL-2 relative min-entropy
from X to Y is at most λ (informally written as DHILL-2(X‖Y ) ≤ λ) if there exists a distribution Y ′
computationally indistinguishable from Y such that D∞(X‖Y ′) ≤ λ. These definitions naturally
generalize to the quantum setting by replacing the distributions with quantum states and taking
the computational indistinguishability to be against polynomial-sized quantum distinguishers (with
classical advice).
With the above definitions, the Dense Model Theorem of [RTTV08] can be equivalently stated
as DHILL-2(X‖Y ) ≤ λ ⇒ DHILL-1(X‖Y ) ≤ λ for λ = O(log κ), where κ is the security parame-
ter. We show that the proof of the Dense Model Theorem can be adapted to show the converse:
DHILL-1(X‖Y ) ≤ λ ⇒ DHILL-2(X‖Y ) ≤ λ for λ = O(log κ) (see Lemma 5.10). Therefore, the
two notions of computational relative min-entropy are equivalent in the classical setting. In con-
trast, in the quantum setting, we show a separation of the two notions of HILL quantum relative
min-entropy.
Theorem 1.3 (Separation of HILL quantum relative min-entropy). For a security parameter κ
3There are several other challenging cases such as when the reduction needs to rewind the adversary [Wat09,
Unr12], or when the setting involves oracles [BDF+11, Zha12].
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and every n = ω(log κ), there exist two n-qubit mixed quantum states ρ, σ ∈ H such that
DHILL-2(ρ‖σ) ≤ 1 but DHILL-1(ρ‖σ) =∞.
The counterexample is based on the existence of pseudorandom pure states [BMW09, GFE09]
(see Section 1.2). Specifically, we take σ to be a pseudorandom pure state, and ρ be a classical
distribution with the first bit equal to 1, and the remaining n − 1 bits being uniform. First,
DHILL-2(ρ‖σ) ≤ 1 since D∞(ρ‖σmix) = 1 and σ is pseudorandom. On the other hand, the fact that
σ is pure implies D∞(τ‖σ) = ∞ for any τ 6= σ. Also, ρ and σ can be distinguished by simply
measuring and outputting the first bit. Therefore, DHILL-1(ρ‖σ) =∞.
1.7 Barrier Result: Impossibility of Quantum Gap Amplification
Herein, we discuss the general barrier to extending proofs of many classical proofs to the quantum
setting. Let us consider the following quantum gap amplification problem: Let p > q > ε ∈ (0, 1) be
parameters, and A a quantum algorithm with n qubits input and binary output. The task here is
to perform a reduction that transforms A into an “amplified” algorithm R such that for every pure
state input |ψ〉, if Pr[A(|ψ〉) = 1] ≥ p, then Pr[R(|ψ〉) = 1] ≥ p′ for p′ > p; if Pr[A(|ψ〉) = 1] ≤ q,
then Pr[R(|ψ〉) = 1] ≤ q′ for q′ < q. A typical setting is p = 2/3, q = 1/3, p′ = 1 − ε, and q′ = ε.
We show that the task is impossible to achieve even if the input is a single qubit.
Theorem 1.4 (Impossibility of Quantum Gap Amplification; informal). For every p′ > p > q >
q′ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a quantum algorithm A with 1 qubit input and binary output such that there
does not exist any quantum algorithm R that solves the gap amplification problem defined above
with respect to p, q, p′, q′, and A.
This impossibility can be viewed as a strengthening of the no-cloning theorem [WZ82], which
states that an unknown quantum pure state cannot be cloned perfectly. Indeed, if the input state
could be cloned perfectly, the gap amplification problem can be solved by ordinary repetitions and
ruling by the majority or a threshold.
For a complexity theory interpretation, we can consider a class of promise problems, where the
instances are pure quantum states, and a promise problem is in the class if there is a (possibly
resource-bounded) quantum algorithm A that distinguishes YES instances from NO instances with
error probability bounded by, say, 1/3. Consequently, such a class is not robust to the choice of
error probability; different choices yield different classes. This is in contrast to complexity classes
such as BPP, BQP, and QMA, where error reduction is possible. The key difference is that, in these
classes the input is classical, and hence can be cloned. In the case of QMA, there is a quantum
witness, but the witness for the amplified algorithm can be allowed to consist of many copies of
the original witness. (There is also a non-trivial way to do error reduction for QMA with single
quantum witness [MW05]. It circumvents the impossibility since the amplification is only defined
with respect to the correct quantum witness.)
To see the impossibility, we sketch a simple argument for the case p = 0.4, q = 0.3, and
ε = 0.1. Consider a quantum algorithm A that takes a single qubit input ρ, measures it in
the computational basis, and outputs the outcome, and the following four pure states: |0〉, |1〉,
|+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2, and |−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2. A outputs 1 with probability 1 on |1〉, 0 on |0〉,
and 0.5 on |+〉 or |−〉. Thus, by definition, R has to accept |0〉 with probability at most 0.1, and
accept |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉 with probability at least 0.9. Now consider the behavior of R on the maximally
mixed state σmix, which can be equivalently described as the uniform distribution over |0〉 and |1〉,
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or as the uniform distribution over |+〉 and |−〉. This means that the acceptance probability of
R on σmix is the average of its acceptance probabilities on |0〉 and |1〉, but also the average of its
acceptance probabilities on |+〉 and |−〉. However these two averages are at most .55 and at least
.9, respectively.
Now, the barrier follows by observing that gap amplification is a common ingredient in many
proofs of classical theorem based on reductions. When a reduction takes unknown quantum states
as input, the impossibility of quantum gap amplification implies that the classical reduction proof
that uses gap amplification cannot be directly generalized to the quantum setting. For example,
in proving the Leakage Chain Rule for rHILL pseudoentropy, we need to construct a reduction R
showing that X conditioned on Z has less than k bits of rHILL pseudoentropy; here R takes both
X and Z as input. Thus, it is difficult to generalize classical proofs of the Leakage Chain Rule (all
of which utilize gap amplification) when X or Z is a quantum state. Nevertheless, we emphasize
that this does not imply that quantum analogues of classical theorems are false, but that different
techniques must be introduced.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum Information
Quantum states. We begin with some notation. Suppose X is a complex vector space with inner
product. A vector in X is denoted by |v〉 and its conjugate transpose is denoted by 〈ψ| = |ψ〉†.
The inner product and outer product of two vectors |v〉 , |w〉 ∈ X are denoted by 〈v|w〉 and |v〉 〈w|,
respectively. The norm of |v〉 is defined by
‖|v〉‖2 =
√
〈v|v〉.
The set of all unit vectors in X is denoted by Ball (X ). Let Lin (X ) denote the set of all linear op-
erators on X . Let Herm (X ) denote the set of all Hermitian operators on space X , i.e., Herm (X ) =
{X ∈ Lin (X ) : X† = X}, where X† is the conjugate transpose of X. The Hilbert-Schmidt inner
product on Lin (X ) is defined by
〈X,Y 〉 = Tr (X†Y ) ,∀X,Y ∈ Lin (X ) .
A quantum state space X of m qubits is the complex Euclidean vector space X = C2m . An
m-qubit quantum state is represented by a density operator ρ in Herm (X ), which is a positive
semidefinite Hermitian operator on X with trace one. When ρ is of rank one, it refers to a pure
quantum state, which can also be represented by a unit vector |ψ〉 in Ball (X ). In that case, the
density operator ρ can be written as |ψ〉〈ψ|. Otherwise, the density operator ρ refers to a mixed
quantum state. Thus in an appropriate basis (anyone that diagonalizes ρ) we can think of ρ as a
classical distribution on the basis elements. In general, the expression is not unique. The set of all
quantum density operators on X is denoted by
Dens (X ) := {ρ ∈ Herm (X ) : ρ ≥ 0,Tr (ρ) = 1} = ConvexHull{|ψ〉〈ψ| : |ψ〉 ∈ Ball (X )},
where the notation ρ ≥ 0 means that ρ is positive semidefinite. Likewise, σ ≥ ρ means that σ − ρ
is positive semidefinite. Let idX denote the identity operator on X (or idd when the dimension of
X is known to be d). Then the maximally mixed state in X is σmix = 1dim(X ) idX , where dim(X ) is
the dimension of X .
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For a quantum system X, its state space is denoted by X and similarly for others. The
state space of the composite system of two quantum systems X and Y is their tensor prod-
uct space X ⊗ Y, and similarly for multiple systems. For a multi-partite state, e.g., ρXY Z ∈
Dens (X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z), its reduced state on some subsystem is represented by the same state with
the corresponding subscript. For example, the reduced (marginal) state on system X of ρXY Z is
ρX = TrYZ (ρXY Z), where TrYZ (·) denotes the partial trace operation over the system Y ⊗Z. That
is, TrYZ (|x1〉 〈x2| ⊗ |y1〉 〈y2| ⊗ |z1〉 〈z2|) = |x1〉 〈x2|Tr (|y1〉 〈y2| ⊗ |z1〉 〈z2|), where |xi〉 , |yi〉 , |zi〉
for i = 1, 2 are vectors in Ball (X ) ,Ball (Y) ,Ball (Z), respectively. It can be verified that if
ρXY Z ∈ Dens (X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z), then ρX ∈ Dens (X ). When all subscript letters are omitted, the
notation represents the original state (e.g., ρ = ρXY Z). Any bipartite state ρXY is called a product
state if and only if ρXY = ρX ⊗ ρY .
If a system X is a discrete random variable X with distribution px = Pr[X = x], it can be
represented by a density operator ρ over a state space X so that ρ = ∑x px |x〉〈x| where {|x〉} is
an orthonormal basis of X . When restricted to the basis |x〉, we will say that the system X is
classical. A classical-quantum-state, or cq-state ρ ∈ Dens (X ⊗ Y) indicates that subsystem X is
classical and subsystem Y is quantum. We use lower case letters to denote specific values assigned
to the classical part of a state. Then a cq-state can be represented by ρXY =
∑
x px |x〉〈x|⊗ ρY (x),
where px = Pr [X = x] and ρY (x) ∈ Dens (Y). It is also easy to see that the marginal state ρY is∑
x pxρY (x).
Quantum measurements. Let Σ be a finite nonempty set of measurement outcomes. A positive-
operator valued measure (POVM) on the state space X with outcomes in Σ is a collection of positive
semidefinite operators {Πa : a ∈ Σ} such that
∑
a∈ΣΠa = idX . When this POVM is applied to
a quantum state ρ ∈ Dens (A), the probability of obtaining outcome a ∈ Σ is 〈ρ,Πa〉. If outcome
a is observed, the quantum state ρ will collapse to the state
√
Πaρ
√
Πa/ 〈ρ,Πa〉, where
√
A =∑
i
√
λi |ai〉 〈ai| if A is a normal operator that admits a spectral decomposition A =
∑
i λi |ai〉 〈ai|.
Matrix Norms. The trace norm of X ∈ Lin (X ) is defined as
‖X‖tr = Tr
(√
X†X
)
.
One important measure on the distance between two quantum states ρ, σ ∈ Dens (X ) is the trace
distance T (ρ, σ), defined by
T (ρ, σ) =
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖tr . (2.1)
The following inequality says that the trace distance of two quantum states is an upper bound on
the difference of their probabilities of obtaining the same measurement outcome [NC00]:
T (ρ, σ) = max
0≤Π≤id
Tr (Π(ρ− σ)) . (2.2)
The operator norm of X ∈ Lin (X ) is
‖X‖op = sup {‖X |v〉‖2 : |v〉 ∈ X with ‖|v〉‖2 = 1} .
When X is Hermitian, the operator norm of X coincides with the following quantity.
‖X‖op = sup
ρ∈Dens(X )
| 〈X, ρ〉 | (2.3)
= sup
|ψ〉∈Ball(X )
| 〈ψ|X |ψ〉 |
= λmax(X),
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where λmax(X) is the largest eigenvalue of X. Once we fix an orthonormal basis {|(i)〉} of X ,
we can consider the max norm of any X ∈ Lin (X ), defined as ‖X‖max = maxi,j |Xij | where
Xij = 〈(i)|X |j〉. We can connect ‖X‖max to ‖X‖op by the following inequality.
‖X‖op ≤ dim(X ) · ‖X‖max . (2.4)
For readers who are interested in the operational interpretation of these norms, we refer them to,
for example, [HJ86].
Quantum Circuits. The evolution of a closed quantum system X is described by a unitary
operator U ∈ Lin (X ), i.e., the operator U satisfying UU † = U †U = idX . The quantum system then
evolves from state ρ ∈ Dens (X ) to UρU † ∈ Dens (X ). If ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, then UρU † = U |ψ〉〈ψ|U † with
U |ψ〉 ∈ Ball (X ). Herein we consider a multiple system, where each subsystem is a two-dimensional
quantum system C2 with an ordered computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. A quantum state in Dens (C2)
is called a qubit (quantum bit), as opposed to a classical bit 0 or 1. Thus an m-qubit state space is
C
2m with a computational basis {|(i)〉 : i = 0, . . . , 2m − 1}. Simple unitary operators that act non-
trivially on a constant number of qubits are called elementary quantum gates. A set of elementary
quantum gates is called universal if any unitary operator can be approximated arbitrarily close by
a composition of gates from this set. Let us fix one universal gate set for the remaining of this
paper.
Let W = X ⊗ A = C2m denote the work space of a quantum circuit C, which is an m-qubit
space that consists of both an ℓ-qubit input space X = C2ℓ , taking some quantum/classical input
ρ ∈ Dens (X ), and some m − ℓ ancilla qubits that are initialized to some state τ ∈ Dens (A).
Depends on the model, τ could be |0A〉 or any quantum state. A quantum circuit C is a sequence
of elementary quantum gates from the universal gate set, followed by some measurements. (In
general, measurements can be deferred to the end of quantum circuits [NC00]) That is, C applies a
unitary UC = U1U2 · · ·Us where Ui denotes the ith gate and s is the number of elementary quantum
gates, and the performs some measurements. We say the size of the quantum circuit C is s. The
number of quantum circuits of size s is sO(s).
Quantum Distinguisher. In cryptography, we usually have a circuit with binary output as a
distinguisher to determine how close two random variables are respect to the circuit. Here we define
the quantum analogue. A quantum distinguisher is a quantum circuit with binary measurement
outcome 0 or 1. Without loss of generosity, we assume that after applying a unitary UC . That is,
we measure ρ′ = UC (ρ⊗ τ)U †C according to the POVM {Π0,Π1}, where Πi = |(i)〉〈(i)| ⊗ id2m−1 .
Thus
Pr[C outputs i on input ρ] =
〈
ρ′,Πi
〉
=
〈
UC (ρ⊗ τ)U †C , |(i)〉〈(i)| ⊗ id2m−1
〉
=
〈
ρ⊗ τ, U †C (|(i)〉〈(i)| ⊗ id2m−1)UC
〉
=
〈
ρ,Π′i
〉
,
where
Πi = TrA
(
idX ⊗ τ
(
U †C(|(i)〉〈(i)| ⊗ id−1)UC
)
idX ⊗ τ
)
,∀i ∈ {0, 1}, (2.5)
Consequently, this quantum circuit is equivalent to perform a POVM {Π′0,Π′1} on the input
space X as above. For our purpose, a quantum distinguishers will be considered as a binary POVM
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on the input space X . In this case, since Π0 + Π1 = id, the POVM can be fully determined by
Π1. For convenience, we use the term BPOVM to represent the positive-operator Π1 in a POVM.
Especially, we can describe a quantum distinguisher by a BPOVM and vice versa.
One can easily generalize the binary output to larger domains. In that case, any quantum
circuit can still be effectively deemed as a general POVM with a large outcome set. When the
input state is a product state of a classical input x and a quantum input ρ, we abuse the notation
as follows
C(x, ρ) = C(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ).
We also consider more general quantum circuits that output general quantum states. These
circuits can be deemed as mappings from Dens (X ) to Dens (Y), where X is the input space and Y is
the output space. (In general, these mappings are called super-operators from Lin (X ) to Lin (Y).)
Similar to quantum distinguishers, a general quantum circuit C applies a unitary UC on the space
W = X ⊗ A consisting of an input and ancillas, and perform some measurements on B. Then it
outputs a state in space Y where W = Y ⊗ B is the decomposition of the space after applying UC .
We abuse the notation again for convenience as
ρ 7→ C(ρ) ∈ Dens (Y)
for input ρ ∈ Dens (X ).
2.2 Information-Theoretic Notions
We will first define the relative min-entropy (a.k.a max-divergence) of two quantum states, which
will be used to define the conditional quantum min-entropy [RW05]. Relative min-entropy can be
seen as a distance between two quantum states. The distance measures, in logarithm, of how much
more likely an event happens for one state than the other.
Definition 2.1 (Quantum relative min-entropy). Let ρ and σ be two density operators on a space
H. The relative min-entropy between two quantum states ρ and σ is defined as
D∞(ρ‖σ) def= inf{λ ∈ R : ρ ≤ 2λσ}.
Equivalently, quantum relative min-entropy can be defined in an operational way using binary
measurement.
Proposition 2.2. Let ρ and σ be density operators on a state space H. Then
D∞(ρ‖σ) = inf{λ ∈ R : ∀A : Dens (H)→ {0, 1},E [A(ρ)] ≤ 2λ E [A(σ)]}.
Proof. It suffices to show that for γ > 0, γσ ≥ ρ if and only if γ E [A(σ)] ≥ E [A(ρ)] for every
quantum circuit A. Let Π be the BPOVM of A, then E [A(γσ − ρ)] = 〈Π, γσ − ρ〉.
If γσ− ρ ≥ 0, then 〈Π, γσ − ρ〉 ≥ 0, since 〈A,B〉 ≥ 0 for A,B ≥ 0. On the other hand, suppose
〈Π, γσ − ρ〉 ≥ 0 for any BPOVM Π. Then particularly, take Π = |ψ〉〈ψ|, 〈|ψ〉〈ψ| , γσ − ρ〉 =
〈ψ| γσ − ρ |ψ〉 ≥ 0 for any |ψ〉 ∈ Ball (H). This concludes the proof.
The definition of quantum relative-min entropy agrees with the definition of classical max
divergence definition when the two quantum states are equivalent to classical random variables.
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Proposition 2.3. If ρ and σ are mixed quantum states corresponding to two classical random
variables X and Y respectively. Then
D∞(ρ‖σ) = log max
x∈Supp(Y )
(Pr[X = x]/Pr[Y = x]).
Proof. By the assumption, we can write ρ =
∑
x pi |x〉〈x| and σ =
∑
x qi |x〉〈x| for Pr[X = x] =
px, P r[Y = x] = qx. Then
D∞(ρ‖σ) = inf
λ
{∀i pi ≤ 2λqi} = logmax
i
pi/qi = logmax
x
(Pr[X = x]/Pr[Y = x]).
Definition 2.4 (Conditional quantum min-entropy). Let ρ = ρXB ∈ Dens (X ⊗ B) be a density
operator describing a bipartite quantum system (X,B). The min-entropy of system X conditioned
on system B is defined as
Hmin(X|B)ρ def= log |X | − inf
σB∈Dens(B)
{
D∞
(
ρXB
∥∥∥∥ 1|X | idX ⊗ σB
)}
.
Proposition 2.5. If X and B are classical random variables, then
Hmin(X|B)ρ = 1
log
∑
bmaxx pxb
= Hmin(X|B).
Proof. Since X,B are classical random variables, we abuse the notation X ,B to be the finite spaces
that X and B are distributed over, respectively. Let UX be the uniform distribution over the set
X . Then by Definition 2.4,
Hmin(X|B)ρ = log |X | − inf
Q: dist. over B
{D∞(X,B‖UX , Q)}
= log |X | − log inf
Q: dist. over B
{
max
x,b
pxb
Pr[(UX , Q) = (x, b)]
}
= − log inf∑
b qb=1
{
max
b
maxx pxb
qb
}
,
where qb = Pr[Q = b]. The minimum happens when (maxx pxb)/qb are equal for all b ∈ B (Can be
seen by Lagrange multiplier). Then we get
Hmin(X|B)ρ = inf∑
b qb=1
{
max
b
maxx pxb
qb
}
= − log
(∑
b
max
x
pxb
)
,
which is exactly the definition of average min-entropy in the classical case [DORS08].
While min-entropy in Definition 2.4 describes the average case that one can guess about a
random source, we may also define the worst-case min-entropy as in the classical case [RW05].
Definition 2.6 (Worst-case conditional quantum min-entropy). Let ρ = ρXB ∈ Dens (X ⊗ B) be
a density operator describing a bipartite quantum system (X,B). The worst-case min-entropy of
system X conditioned on system B is defined as
Hwstmin(X|B)ρ def= log |X | −D∞
(
ρXB
∥∥∥∥ 1|X | idX ⊗ ρB
)
,
where ρB = TrX (ρXB).
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If X and B are classical random variables, Definition 2.6 agrees with the classical definition of
the worst-case min-entropy Hwstmin(X|B) = − logmaxx,bPr[X = x|B = b]. Also it is clear that the
two entropies are equal when system B is trivial: Hwstmin(X)ρ = Hmin(X)ρ. The following chain rule
provides a connection between these two entropies.
Proposition 2.7. Let ρ = ρXB ∈ Dens (X ⊗ B) be a density operator describing a bipartite quan-
tum system (X,B). Suppose B is an ℓ-qubit system. Then
Hmin(X|B)ρ ≥ Hwstmin(X,B)ρ − ℓ.
Proof. Let λ = log |X | −Hwstmin(X,B)ρ. That is,
ρXB ≤ 2λ idX|X | ⊗ idB = 2
λ+ℓ idX
|X | ⊗
idB
2ℓ
.
Thus by Definition 2.4, Hmin(X|B)ρ ≥ Hwstmin(X,B)ρ − ℓ.
Another way to define min entropy is to use guessing probability. Here we only consider the case
that ρXB is a cq-state: ρXB =
∑
x px |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB for ρxB ∈ Dens (B). The probability of guessing
X correctly given B by a given quantum circuit C is
P guessC (X|B)ρ =
∑
x
Pr[X = x] 〈Πx, ρxB〉 ,
where {Πx} is the effective POVM for C, demonstrating the guessing strategy. Accordingly, the
probability of guessing X correctly given B is defined as
P guess(X|B)ρ = max
C
P guessC (X|B)ρ, (2.6)
where the maximization is taken over arbitrary quantum circuits C of unbounded size. As in the
purely classical case [DORS08], the guessing probability captures the conditional min-entropy of X
given B:
Lemma 2.8 ([KRS09]). Suppose ρXB is a cq-state on the space X ⊗ B. Then
Hmin(X|B)ρ = − log(P guess(X|B)).
2.3 Leakage Chain Rules
One of our main result is the leakage chain rule for computational quantum min-entropy. The
information-theoretic version of the Leakage Chain Rule is a necessary step in our proof.
Theorem 2.9 ([WTHR11, Lemma 13] Leakage chain rule for quantummin-entropy). Let ρ = ρXZB
be a state on the space X ⊗ Z ⊗ B. Let d = min{dim(X ⊗ Z),dim(B)} and ℓ = log dim(B). Then
Hmin(X|ZB)ρ ≥ Hmin(X|Z)ρ − 2ℓ.
We remark that Theorem 2.9 is tight. In the case that the dimensions of X and B are both 2ℓ,
X and B are maximally entangled, it is easy to verify that Hmin(X|B)ρ = −ℓ and Hmin(X) = ℓ.
Also, the factor 2 is crucial for the application in proving the lower bound of superdense coding.
For more detail, see [CCLW17].
On the other hand, when B is separable from (X,Z), the loss of the entropy is at most ℓ instead
of 2ℓ. Specifically, when the leakage B is classical, there is no entanglement between Z and B.
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Theorem 2.10 (Chain rule for quantum min-entropy of separable states). Let ρ = ρXZB be a
separable state on the space (X ⊗ Z) ⊗ B. Namely, ρXZB =
∑
k pkρ
k
XZ ⊗ ρkB. Suppose B is an
ℓ-qubit system. Then
Hmin(X|ZB)ρ ≥ Hmin(X|Z)ρ − ℓ.
2.4 Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update Method
Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update (MMWU) Method is a generalization of multiplicative
weights algorithm. It is a fundamental technique in learning theory and provides a way to ap-
proximate a unknown function efficiently in an iterative way. Numerous applications on faster al-
gorithms for SDPs [AHK12, Kal07] and classical simulations of quantum complexity classes [JW09,
JJUW10, Wu10, GW13]. In the matrix generalization, a weight vector is generalized to a weight
matrix. We will use the following abstraction of the MMWU method.
Theorem 2.11 (Matrix multiplicative weights update method [Kal07, Thm. 10]). Fix η ∈ (0, 1/2)
and let L(1), . . . , L(T ) be arbitrary d × d “loss” matrices with −c1 · idd ≤ L(t) ≤ c2 · idd ∀t ∈ [T ].
Define d × d weight matrices W (1), . . . ,W (T ) and density operators ρ(1), . . . , ρ(T ) ∈ Dens (Cd) by
the following update algorithm.
1. Initialization: W (1) = idd
2. For t = 1, . . . , T ,
(a) Normalization: ρ(t) =W (t)/Tr
(
W (t)
)
(b) Update: W (t+1) =W (t) · exp (−ηL(t))
Then for all density operators σ ∈ Dens (Cd), we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
ρ(t), L(t)
〉
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
σ,L(t)
〉
+ (c1 + c2)
(
η +
ln d
ηT
)
.
Particularly, let c1 and c2 be constants, and η =
√
ln d/T , we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
ρ(t), L(t)
〉
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
σ,L(t)
〉
+O
(√
log d
T
)
.
2.5 Quantum Tomography
In a quantum tomography problem, one wants to learn the behavior or even a description of a
quantum circuit or quantum state. In our applications, we specifically want to solve the following
problem. We show more details and the proofs of related lemmas in Appendix A.
Definition 2.12 (QCkt-Tomography Problem). The QCkt-Tomography(s, d, ε, γ) problem
is a computational problem defined as follows:
• Input: a description of a quantum circuit C : Dens (Cd) → {0, 1} of size-s, and an error
parameter 0 < ε < 1.
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• Task: let Π be the corresponding BPOVM of C. Output an explicit description (as matrices)
of BPOVM Π˜ such that
∥∥∥Π− Π˜∥∥∥
op
≤ ε with probability 1− γ.
Lemma 2.13. There exists a (uniform) quantum algorithm that solves the QCkt-Tomography(s, d, ε, γ)
Problem in time poly(s, d, 1/ε, log(1/γ)).
3 Quantum Indistinguishability / Pseudorandomness
3.1 Quantum Indistinguishability
Computational indistinguishability is a fundamental concept of computational complexity and
pseudorandomness. It provides a relaxed way to describe the similarity of two random objects.
Informally, computational indistinguishability only requires that two random objects cannot be
distinguished by efficient algorithms/circuits. Two objects may be indistinguishable by a bounded
algorithm even if their entropies difference is significant.
We use (s, ε)-indistinguishability to describe two objects cannot be distinguished with advantage
more than ε by all s-size circuits with ancilla bits initialized to |0〉s. Contrary, we use (s, ε)∗-
indistinguishability when the ancilla bits can be initialized as any quantum states. Formally, we
have the following definitions.
Definition 3.1. Quantum states ρ and σ on H are (s, ε)-quantum-indistinguishable if for all size-s
quantum distinguishers D with ancilla bits initialized to |0〉s,
|E [D(ρ)]− E [D(σ)] | ≤ ε.
Moreover, we say that ρ is an (s, ε)-quantum-pseudorandom state if ρ is (s, ε)quantum-indistinguishable
from the maximally mixed state on H.
Definition 3.2. Quantum states ρ and σ on H are (s, ε)∗-quantum-indistinguishable if for all size-s
quantum distinguishers D with arbitrary ancilla bits τ ,
|E [D(ρ)]− E [D(σ)] | ≤ ε.
Moreover, we say that ρ is an (s, ε)∗-quantum-pseudorandom state if ρ is (s, ε)∗quantum-indistinguishable
from the maximally mixed state on H.
If we consider the indistinguishability in asymptotic settings, in the case that the algorithm with
classical advice, equivalently, it can be described as an ensemble of nonuniform quantum circuits
{Cn}n∈N where their ancilla bits are initialized to be all |0〉s. On the other hand, the algorithm
with quantum advice can be described as an ensemble of quantum circuits {Cn}n∈N where their
ancilla bits are initialized to be {τn}n∈N. Note that τn can only depend on n and could be a state
that cannot be generated efficiently.
Definition 3.3. Let s : N → N and ε : N → R be two functions. Let {ρn}n∈N and {σn}n∈N
be two quantum state ensembles where ρn, σn ∈ Dens
(
C
2n
)
. We say {ρn}n∈N and {σn}n∈N are
(s, ε)-quantum-indistinguishable (resp., (s, ε)∗-quantum-indistinguishable), if for every non-uniform
ensemble of quantum circuit with classical (resp. quantum) advice {Cn}n∈N, and the size of Cn is
at most s(n), we have for all n ∈ N,
|Pr [Cn(ρn) = 1]− Pr [Cn(σn) = 1] | ≤ ε(n).
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Now lets consider the uniform setting. A quantum polynomial time algorithm is a uniform
ensemble of quantum circuit {Cn}n∈N, which can be generated by a Turing machine in poly(n)
time. Without loss of generosity, we can still assume the ancilla bits are initialized to all |0〉s. If
two ensembles are indistinguishable by all polynomial-time algorithms, they are computationally
indistinguishable. Formally,
Definition 3.4. Let {ρn}n∈N and {σn}n∈N be two quantum state ensembles where ρn, σn ∈ Dens
(
C
2n
)
.
We say {ρn}n∈N and {σn}n∈N are quantum-indistinguishable, if for every quantum polynomial time
algorithm {Cn}n∈N and every polynomial function p(·), for all but finitely many n, we have
|Pr [Cn(ρn) = 1]− Pr [Cn(σn) = 1] | ≤ 1
p(n)
.
3.2 Pseudorandom Pure State
Classically, there exists a random variable ensemble {Xn ∈ {0, 1}n}n∈N that is far from the uniform
distribution Un but are computationally indistinguishable from Un by any algorithm runs in poly(n)
time. Note that the min-entropy of such Xn strings is at least ω(log n). In the quantum setting,
we have a pseudorandom state as an analogue. We will state the results in non-uniform settings.
Also, we fix the security parameter for simplicity. The following result of Bremner, Mora, and
Winter [BMW09] (stated in our language) says that a pseudorandom object can be a pure state,
which has zero entropy.
Theorem 3.5 ([BMW09]). For all s ∈ N and ε > 0, there exists an (s, ε)-quantum-pseudorandom
pure state ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ Dens (C2m) with m = O(log(s/ε)) that is (s, ε)-pseudorandom. Further-
more, such ρ can be obtained by a uniformly random pure state |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ Dens (C2m) with all but
2−Ω(2
m) probability.
We emphasize that the existence of a pseudorandom pure state only holds when we consider
distinguishers without quantum advice. Otherwise, for a pure state ρ, one can hardwire the same
state as an advice, then it can be distinguished from a maximally mixed state by using Swap Test.
Here we provide a simpler sampling method to show the existence of pseudorandom pure state,
whose coefficients are all 2−m/2 or 2m/2.
Theorem 3.6. For all s ∈ N and ε > 0, there exists m = O(log(s/ε)) such that, if we uniformly
sample (α1, . . . α2m) from {−2−m/2,−2−m/2}2m and let ρ =
∑2m
i=1 αi |(i)〉, then with all but 2−Ω(2
m)
probability, ρ is an (s, ε)-quantum-pseudorandom pure state.
Proof. Let A : Dens
(
C
2m
) → {0, 1} be some fixed quantum distinguisher corresponding to a
BPOVM Π. Then
Pr
[
A(ρ
(m)
mix ) = 1
]
=
1
2m
〈Π, id2m〉 = 1
2m
∑
(i)
〈(i)|Π |(i)〉 ,
where the probability is over the measurement taken by A. For a fixed ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| with |ψ〉 =∑
(i) αi |(i)〉, we have
Pr[A(ρ) = 1] = 〈Π1, |ψ〉〈ψ|〉 =
∑
i,j∈[2m]
α∗iαj 〈(i)|Π1 |j〉 =
∑
(i)
|αi|2 〈(i)|Π1 |(i)〉+
∑
i 6=j
α∗iαj 〈(i)|Π1 |j〉 ,
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Taking expectation over α = (α1, . . . , α2m), we have
E
α
[Pr[A(ρ) = 1]] =E
α
[∑
i
|αi|2 〈(i)|Π1 |(i)〉
]
+ E
α
∑
i 6=j
α∗iαj 〈(i)|Π1 |j〉

=
1
2m
∑
(i)
〈(i)|Π1 |(i)〉 = Pr
[
A(ρ
(m)
mix ) = 1
]
.
For a fixed distinguisher A, define the function on a hypercube f : {−2−m/2,−2−m/2}2m → [0, 1]
as
f(α1, · · · , α2m) = Pr [A(ρ) = 1] = αΠα†.
Now we are going to show the concentration using Talagrand’s inequality. To that end, we first
find the Lipschitz constant η of the function f .
|f(α)− f(β)| =|αΠα† − βΠβ†|
≤|αΠα† − αΠβ† + αΠβ† − βΠβ†|
≤ ‖αΠ‖2 · ‖α− β‖2 +
∥∥∥α† − β†∥∥∥
2
·
∥∥∥Πβ†∥∥∥
2
≤2 ‖Π‖op ‖α− β‖2
≤2 ‖α− β‖2 ,
where the second inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality of the Hilbert-Schmidt
inner product of two operators. Therefore the Lipschitz constant η of the function f is at most 2.
Also, f is a convex function.
f((α+ β)/2) ≤ f((α+ β)/2) + f((α− β)/2) = 1
2
(
αΠα† + βΠβ†
)
=
1
2
(f(α) + f(β))
Now we are ready to apply the Talagrand’s concentration inequality: Let α1, · · · , αM be indepen-
dent random variables with |Xi| ≤ K and f : Rn → R be a η-Lipschitz convex function, then there
exists a constant C such that for all t
Pr
α
[
|f(α)− E [f(α)] | ≥ Kt
]
≤ 2−Ct2/η2 .
Take M = 2m, K = 2−m/2, t = 2m/2ε and η = 2, we have
Pr
α
[∣∣∣Pr[A(ρ) = 1]− Pr [A(σ(m)mix ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ ε] = Prα [|f(α)− E [f(α)] | ≥ ε] ≤ 2−Ω(ε2·2m).
There are only sO(s) = 2O(s log s) many different quantum circuits of size s. We can choose some
m = O(log(s/ε)) such then by union bound, there exists a quantum state ρ such that for every
quantum circuit A of size s, we have∣∣∣Pr [A(ρ) = 1]− Pr [A(σ(m)mix ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ ε.
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An interesting follow-up question is that whether we can explicitly generate pseudorandom pure
states, say as the output of a small quantum circuit (with no measurements) on input |0n〉 —
which we could think of as a “seedless” pseudorandom generator. If the generator is of polynomial
size, then its output cannot be pseudorandom against all polynomial-sized distinguishers, because
(measurement-free) quantum computation is reversible. But if we allow the generator circuit to be
larger than the distinguishers then it is conceivable to have a pseudorandom pure state as output.
As aforementioned, in [BHH12, BHH16], they use probabilistic method to show the existence of a
generator circuit of size n11k+9 that can fool all nk-size quantum distinguishers. It would be inter-
esting to construct such generators explicitly under plausible (quantum) complexity assumptions.
4 Quantum Computational Entropy
A uniform distribution can be seen as a special case that it has a full amount of (min-) entropy.
Similar to the definition of pseudorandomness, one can naturally generalize the concept of entropy
in information theory to pseudoentropies in computational settings. The pseudoentropy notions are
useful in cryptography and constructions of pseudorandom generators because it suffices to handle
adversaries with adversaries with limited computational resources.
As one can expect, there are different ways to define computational (min-) entropies. In this
section, we will explore some of the possible relaxations of min-entropy and show some connections.
First, we introduce the quantum analogue of non-uniform min-max theorem [VZ13], which is an
elementary tool of proving the relationship between entropies and the Leakage Chain Rule of a
computational min-entropy in Section 6.
4.1 Quantum Non-Uniform Min-Max Theorem
We begin with von Neumann’s Min-Max Theorem for the zero sum game with two players. Let
the strategy spaces of Player 1 and Player 2 be A and B, respectively, and the payoff function be
g : A × B → [−1, 1]. The theorem says that if for every mixed strategy A ∈ Conv(A), Player 2
can respond b ∈ B so that the expected payoff Ea←A [g(a, b)] ≥ p, then Player 2 has an universal
mixed strategy B ∈ Conv(B) that guarantees the same payoff regardless of the strategy of Player 1.
Namely, for all a ∈ A,Eb←B [g(a, b)] ≥ p. In many applications in cryptography and complexity
theory, (e.g., [Imp95, RTTV08, DP08, GW11, VZ12]), people consider the strategy space A to be
a set of distributions over {0, 1}n. Moreover, those applications require not only the existence of a
universal mixed strategy, but also a strategy with low complexity (measured in the number of pure
strategies of Player 2).
In this section, we generalize the classical non-uniform Min-max theorem in [VZ12] to the
quantum setting. Specifically, the game we consider has the following structure. The strategy
space A is in Dens (Cd). The payoff function g : Conv(A) × B → [0, 1] is restricted to the form
g(a, b) = 〈a, f(b)〉 where f is a function maps B to a d-dimension matrix M with 0 ≤ M ≤ idd.
Note that if we restrict both player 1’s strategy and M to be diagonal matrices, then it replicates
the above classical definition with d = 2n.
Theorem 4.1 (Quantum Non-uniform Min-Max Theorem). Consider the above quantum zero-sum
game. Suppose that for every mixed strategies a ∈ Conv(A) of Player 1, there exists a pure strategy
b ∈ B such that g(a, b) ≥ p. Then for every ε ∈ (0, 1/2), there exists some mixed strategy Bˆ of
Player 2 such that for every strategy a ∈ A of Player 1, Eb←Bˆ [g(a, b)] ≥ p− ε. Moreover, Bˆ is the
uniform distribution over a multi-set S consists of at most O
(
log d/ε2
)
strategies in B.
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Notice that we only assume Conv(A) is contained in Dens
(
C
d
)
but not equal. Indeed, for the
application in Section 4.2, Conv(A) will be the set of all high entropy quantum states. As a result,
directly applying the MMWU algorithm shown Theorem 2.11 by letting ρ(t) = a(t) does not suffice
for proving this theorem, because there is no guarantee that the (normalized) weight matrix still
belongs Conv(A) after the update. To fix that, we have to “project” the weight matrix back to the
set Conv(A).
Definition 4.2 (KL Divergence of Quantum States). Let ρ and σ be two density matrices, the KL
divergence (relative entropy) between them is defined as
D (ρ‖σ) = Tr (ρ(log ρ− log σ)) .
Definition 4.3 (KL Projection). Let σ be quantum states on Dens
(
C
d
)
, which contains a convex
set A. ρ∗ is a KL projection of σ on A if
ρ∗ = argmin
ρ∈A
D (ρ‖σ)
Proof. We consider the following MMWU procedure (modified from ones in [TRW05, WK12]) to
obtain the multi-set S.
Procedure 4.1
1. Initially, W (1) = idd, a
(1) = 1d idd.
2. For t = 1, . . . , T ,
(a) Obtain the best strategy of Player 2:
b(t) = argmax
b∈B
g(a, b) = argmax
b∈B
〈a, f(b)〉 .
(b) Update the weight matrix: a(t+1)
′
= exp
(
log a(t) − ηf(bt)) where η =√
ln d/T < 1.
(c) Do a normalization to get a density matrix: a(t+1)
′′
= a(t+1)
′
/Tr
(
a(t+1)
′
)
.
(d) Let a(t+1) be a KL projection of a(t+1)
′′
on Conv(A).
3. Output S = {b(1),...,b(T )}.
We emphasize that the algorithm differs from the one in Theorem 2.11 in two places. First, as
mentioned before, we have the step (d): project the weight matrix back to the convex set. Second,
in the step (b), instead of multiply the update matrix to a(t), we put a(t) in the exponent. Note
that they are not equivalent because matrix does not commute in multiplication generally. This
modification is needed if we want to prove the same property using KL-divergence.
Considering the above procedure, similar to the Theorem 2.11, we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
a, f(b(t))
〉
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
a(i), f(b(t))
〉
−O
(√
log d/T
)
Without the projection step, the above inequality was shown In [TRW05, WK12], they showed
the above inequality when the procedure without step (d). Even though, when there is the projec-
tion step, the proof much follows the ones in [TRW05, WK12]. For the completeness, we prove it
as Lemma C.2.
21
Additional to the inequality, by the fact that in the step 2(b), b(t) is the best strategy against
a(t), we have for all a ∈ A,
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
a, f(b(t))
〉
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
a(i), f(b(t))
〉
−O
(√
log d/T
)
≥ p−O
(√
log d/T
)
Set T = O(log d/ε2), we get
∀a, E
b←S
[g(a, b)] =
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
a, f(b(t))
〉
≥ p− ε.
4.2 Computational Min-entropy
In the classical setting, a definition of computational entropy was given by H˚astad et. al. [HILL99].
It says that a random variable X has HILL pseudo-min-entropy (HILL pseudoentropy for short)
at least k if it is indistinguishable from some random variable Y with (true) min-entropy (with B
trivial in Definition 2.4) at least k. Another natural definition of computational entropy is the Met-
ric pseudo-(min)-entropy which switches the quantifiers in the definition of HILL pseudoentropy.
That is, X has metric pseudoentropy at least k if, for every efficient distinguisher, there exists a
random variable Y with min entropy at least k such that X and Y cannot be distinguished by
the distinguisher. One can also define computational entropies (when X is classical) via guessing
probabilities. Recall that using guessing probability, one can equivalently define the conditional
min-entropy (cf. Lemma 2.8). We can also get a relaxed notion by restricting the complexity of
guessing algorithms, and we call it guessing pseudoentropy. Below, we formally define the quantum
analogues of those relaxed notions.
Definition 4.4 (Conditional (relaxed-)HILL pseudoentropy). Let ρ = ρXB be a bipartite quan-
tum state in Dens (X ⊗ B). We say X conditioned on B has (s, ε)-relaxed-HILL pseudoentropy
H rHILLs,ε (X|B)ρ ≥ k if there exists a bipartite quantum state σXB on Dens (X ⊗ B) such that (i)
Hmin(X|B)σ ≥ k, and (ii) ρXB and σXB are (s, ε)-indistinguishable. In addition, if TrX (ρXB) =
TrX (σXB), we say X conditioned on B has (regular) HILL pseudoentropy HHILLs,ε (X|B)ρ ≥ k.
As in the definition of conditional relaxed-HILL pseudoentropy [HLR07], we do not require the
reduced states ρB and σB being equal in relaxed-HILL pseudoentropy. In the classical case, the
relaxed HILL notion satisfies a chain rule even when a prior knowledge Z is present, while for the
regular HILL pseudoentropy, a counterexample exists (under a standard assumption) [KPW13].
Another remark here is that when the length of B is O(log n), it is not hard to see that the two
definitions are equivalent in the classical case. However, we do not know whether that is still the
case if B is a quantum state of O(log n) qubits.
Definition 4.5 (Conditional (relaxed-)metric pseudoentropy). Let ρ = ρXB be a bipartite quantum
state in Dens (X ⊗ B). We say that X conditioned on B has (s, ε)-relaxed-metric pseudoentropy
Hmetric-rlxs,ε (X|B)ρ ≥ k if for all size-s quantum distinguisher D, there exists a bipartite quantum
state σY C on Dens (X ⊗ B) such that (i) Hmin(X|B)σ ≥ k and (ii) |E [D(ρXB)] − E [D(σXB)] | <
ε. In addition, if TrX (ρXB) = TrX (σXB), we say X conditioned on B has (regular) metric
pseudoentropy Hmetrics,ε (X|B)ρ ≥ k.
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Definition 4.6 (Guessing pseudoentropy). Let ρXB =
∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB be a cq-state. We
say that X conditioned on B has (s, ε)-quantum guessing pseudoentropy Hguesss,ε (X|B)ρ ≥ k if for
every quantum circuit A of size s, the probability of guessing X correctly given B by the circuit A
is P guessA (X|B) ≤ 2−k + ε.
4.3 Connections between computational notions
HILL pseudoentropy v.s. metric pseudoentropy In the classical case, it is known that
the HILL and metric entropies are interchangeable [BSW03] up to some degradation in the size
of distinguishers. With the equivalence, metric pseudoentropy is a useful intermediate notion to
obtain tighter security proof in a number of cases (e.g., [DP08, FOR15]). Here we will show the
analogue transformation in the quantum case.
Theorem 4.7 ((relaxed-)HILL ⇔ (relaxed-)metric). Let ρXB be a bipartite quantum system in
Dens (X ⊗ B) where dim(X ) = N and dim(B) = L. If Hmetrics,ε (X|B)ρ ≥ k (resp., Hmetric-rlxs,ε (X|B)ρ ≥
k), then HHILLs′,ε′ (X|B) ≥ k (resp., H rHILLs′,ε′ (X|B) ≥ k), where ε′ = ε+δ and s = s′·O
(
(logN + logL)/δ2
)
for any δ > 0.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let HHILLs′,ε′ (X|B)ρ < k. Then for all σXB ∈ Dens (X ⊗ B) with
Hmin(X|B)σ ≥ k and ρB = σB , there exists a quantum distinguisher D : Dens (X ⊗ B)→ {0, 1} of
size s′ such that
E [D(ρXB)]− E [D(σXB)] > ε′.
We define the following zero-sum game:
• The strategy space of Player 1 is A = {σXB ∈ Dens (X ⊗ B) : Hmin(X|B)σ ≥ k}.
• The strategy space of Player 2 B is a set of all distinguishers D : Dens (X ⊗ B) → {0, 1} of
size s′.
• For the payoff function g : A × B → [0, 1], we first define the auxiliary mapping f . For an
input distinguisher D ∈ B, let Π be its BPOVM, we let
f(D) =
1
2
(
E [D(ρXB)] · iddim(N+L) −Π+ idd
)
.
Then
g(σXB ,D) = 〈σXB, f(D)〉 =
(
E [D(ρXB)]− E [D(σXB)] + 1
)
/2.
Note that the strategy space A is convex, and by the assumption, for all σXB ∈ A = Conv(A),
there exists a distinguisher D ∈ B such that g(σXB ,D) > (1 + ε′)/2. By Theorem 4.1, there exists
a circuit D˜ of size s′ ·O ((logN + logL)/δ2) such that for all σXB with Hmin(X|B)σ ≥ k(
E
[
D˜(ρXB)
]
− E
[
D˜(σXB)
]
+ 1
)
/2 > (1 + ε′)/2 − δ/2
E
[
D˜(ρXB)
]
− E
[
D˜(σXB)
]
> δ
which contradict the assumption Hmetrics,ε (X|B)ρ ≥ k.
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Remark 4.8. In the above discussion, we define the computational entropies and state the theorems
only respect to quantum distinguishers with classical advice. One can also consider HILL/metric
pseudoentropy respect to quantum distinguishers with quantum advice. The transformation between
metric and HILL pseudoentropy still works in this model, since in the proof, we view distinguishers
as BPOVM matrices without utilizing the fact that the advice is classical.
Guessing pseudoentropy v.s. HILL pseudoentropy Vadhan and Zheng showed that in the
classical case, the HILL pseudoentropy and the guessing pseudoentropy are equivalent when n is
logarithmic in the security parameter [VZ12]. In fact when n = 1, the equivalence between the HILL
pseudoentropy and the guessing pseudoentropy implies Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Theorem [Imp95]
and vice versa. However, in the quantum case, we do not know whether these two definitions are
equivalent. All the proofs suffer the same barrier, and we will mention it in Section 8. Briefly
speaking, a proof cannot be extended to the quantum case if it relies on estimating the acceptance
probability of a given quantum state. Therefore, connections between guessing pseudoentropy and
other pseudoentropy notions remain as interesting open problems.
5 Quantum Relative Min-Entropy
In this section, we consider relative min-entropy in the quantum setting. By definition, it can be
seen as a generalization of min-entropy. That is, the relative min-entropy between a quantum state
ρ ∈ Dens (C2n) and a 2n-dimension maximally mixed state is exactly n minus the min-entropy
of ρ. As for min-entropy notions, we can also consider the computational relaxations of relative
min-entropy. Since relative min-entropy defines a “distance” between two states, there are more
possible ways to define its relaxed notions. Classically, some relations between different relaxations
are described by the Dense Model Theorem [RTTV08]. In Section 5.2, we review the theorem and
consider a variation to show more connections among the various notions. For the quantum case,
we show in Section 5.3 that some notions are not equivalent, which can be interpreted as that a
“Quantum Dense Model Theorem” does not hold.
5.1 Definition
Following the HILL-type generalization, there are already two ways to generalize the relative min-
entropy (Definition 2.1) to computational notions. First, we can say if ρ has computational relative
min-entropy with respect to σ, then there exists ρ′ that is indistinguishable from ρ, but has bounded
relative min-entropy respective to σ entropy. Or, we can have σ′ that is indistinguishable from σ
as the bridge.
Definition 5.1 (HILL-1 relative min-entropy). Let ρ and σ be density operators of the same system.
DHILL-1s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ if there exists ρ′ that is (s, ε)-indistinguishable from ρ and D∞(ρ′‖σ) ≤ λ.
Definition 5.2 (HILL-2 relative min-entropy). Let ρ and σ be density operators of the same system.
DHILL-2s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ if there exists σ′ that is (s, ε)-indistinguishable from ρ and D∞(ρ‖σ′) ≤ λ.
By switching the quantifiers, we can also have two metric-type generalizations.
Definition 5.3 (metric-1 relative min-entropy). Let ρ and σ be density operators of the same
system. Dmetric-1s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ if for all s-size quantum distinguisher A, there exists ρ′ such that (i)
D∞(ρ′‖σ) ≤ λ. (ii) E [A(ρ)]− E [A(ρ′)] < ε.
24
Definition 5.4 (metric-2 relative min-entropy). Let ρ and σ be density operators of the same
system. Dmetric-2s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ if for all s-size quantum distinguisher A, there exists σ′ such that (i)
D∞(ρ‖σ′) ≤ λ. (ii) E [A(σ)]− E [A(σ′)] < ε.
Another approach is to follow the “guessing-type” generalization. As in min-entropy, there is
an equivalent way to define relative min-entropy, using unbounded circuits. Naturally, we can also
relax the definition by restricting the size of the circuits.
Definition 5.5 (Pseudo relative min-entropy). Let ρ and σ be density operators of the same system.
Then Dpseudos,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ if for all s-size quantum distinguisher A, we have E [A(ρ)] ≤ 2λ E [A(σ)]+ε.
By the definitions, we immediately have the following relations.
Proposition 5.6. Let σmix be the maximally mixed state in Dens
(CM) For any k, s ∈ N, ε, λ > 0
and quantum states ρ, σ ∈ Dens (CM), we have
1. DHILL-2s,ε (ρ‖σmix) ≤ logM − k if and only if HHILLs,ε (ρ) ≥ k.
2. Dmetric-2s,ε (ρ‖σmix) ≤ logM − k if and only if Hmetrics,ε (ρ) ≥ k.
3. If DHILL-1s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ, then Dmetric-1s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ and Dpseudos,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ.
4. If DHILL-2s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ, then Dmetric-2s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ and Dpseudos,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ.
Since we can switch the quantifiers using the quantum min-max theorem (Theorem 4.1), the
HILL-type and metric-type relative min-entropies are also interchangeable up to some parameter
loss.
Theorem 5.7. Let σ and ρ be quantum states in Dens (H) where dim(H) = N . If Dmetric-1s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤
λ (resp., Dmetric-2s,ε (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ), then DHILL-1s′,ε′ (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ (resp., DHILL-2s′,ε′ (ρ‖σ) ≤ λ, where ε′ = 2ε and
s = s′ ·O(logN/ε2).
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that DHILL-1s′,ε′ (ρ‖σ) > λ, then for all ρ′ with D(ρ′‖σ) > λ, there
exists an s′-size distinguisher A such that E [A(ρ)] − E [A(ρ′)] > ε′. We consider the following
zero-sum game:
1. The strategy space of Player 1 is {ρ′ ∈ Dens (H) : D(ρ′‖σ) > λ}.
2. The strategy space of Player 2 is a set of all s′-size distinguisher A : Dens (H)→ {0, 1}.
3. Let the BPOVM of a distinguisher A be Π. Define the auxiliary mapping f , which maps A
to E [A(ρ)] iddim(H) −Π. Then the payoff for the player strategies ρ′ and A is
g(ρ′, A) =
〈
ρ′, f(A)
〉
= E [A(ρ)]− E [A(σ)] .
By the nonuniform Quantum Min-max Theorem (Theorem 4.1), there exists a universal distin-
guisher of size s = s′ · (log(N)/ε2) such that for all ρ′ with D(ρ′‖σ) > λ,
E [A(ρ)]− E [A(σ)] > ε′ − ε = ε.
By the definition of metric relative entropy, we get Dmetric-1s,ε (ρ, σ) > λ, which yields a contradiction.
Similarly, we can have the same argument for type-2 notions. Note that, the strategy space of
Player 1 is convex in either case, so Theorem 4.1 can be applied.
In the rest of the section, we will only focus on the HILL-type and guessing notions.
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Figure 1: Relationships between computational relative min-entropies in the classical setting
5.2 Classical Dense Model Theorem
In the classical case, the relation between HILL-1, HILL-2 and pseudo relative min-entropies are
partly captured by Dense Model Theorem. Specifically, the Dense Model Theorem [RTTV08] indi-
cates that HILL-2 relative min-entropy implies HILL-1 relative min-entropy. Also the strong Dense
Model Theorem4 says that pseudo relative min-entropy implies HILL-1 relative min-entropy [MPRV09].
Here we additionally show that HILL-1 relative min-entropy also implies HILL-2 relative min-
entropy. Therefore, all those three notions are equivalent in the classical setting. (See Figure 1 for
their relationships)
Recall the definition of “density”. Suppose X,Y are distributions over {0, 1}n. We say X is
δ-dense in Y if
∀x ∈ {0, 1}n, Pr[X = x] ≤ 1
δ
Pr[Y = x].
Then X is 2−λ-dense in Y if and only if D∞(X‖Y ) ≤ λ.
The statement of Dense Model Theorem is as follows.
Theorem 5.8 (Dense Model Theorem [RTTV08]). For any s, n ∈ N and 0 < ε, δ < 1, let X,Y,Z
be three distributions over {0, 1}n such that X and Y are (s, ε)-indistinguishable and Z is δ-dense
in X. Then there exists a distribution M over {0, 1}n such that M is δ-dense in Y and M is
(s′, ε′)-indistinguishable form Z, where s′ = poly(s, 1/ε, log(1/δ)) and ε′ = O(ε/δ).
Figure 2 is the visualization of the relationships between the distributions in Dense Model
Theorem. The theorem gives the positive answer of the existence of the distribution M .
X
δ-dense

comp. indist.
/o/o/o/o/o/o/o Y
δ-dense

Z
comp. indist.
/o/o/o/o/o/o/o M?
Figure 2: Relation diagram of the Dense Model theorem.
Corollary 5.9. For any s, n ∈ N, 0 < ε < 1 and λ > 0, let X,Y be two distributions over {0, 1}n
such that DHILL-2s,ε (X‖Y ) ≤ λ, then DHILL-1s′,ε′ ≤ λ where s′ = poly(s, 1/ε, λ) and ε′ = O(ε · 2λ).
4Strong Dense Model Theorem refers the theorem as Theorem 5.8. But instead of having X such that Z dense in
X and Y computationally close to X, we only need the “pseudo-dense” condition between Z and Y .
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Following a similar proof technique, Mironov Pandey Reingold and Vadhan also showed that
pseudo relative min-entropy also imply HILL-1 relative min-entropy [MPRV09] up to some param-
eter loss (we call it “Strong Dense Model Theorem”). However, to the best of our knowledge, it has
not been shown that whether pseudo relative min-entropy is a weaker notion than HILL-2 relative
min-entropy. In fact, we can show that HILL-1 relative min-entropy also implies HILL-2 relative
min-entropy. We state the lemma in the density language.
Lemma 5.10. Let Y,Z,M be three distributions over {0, 1}n such that M is δ-dense in Y and Z
and M are (s, ε)-indistinguishable. Then there exists a distribution X over {0, 1}n such that Z is
δ-dense in X and X is (s, ε)-indistinguishable from Y .
Proof. Since M is δ-dense in Y , there exists a distribution Q such that Y = δM + (1 − δ)Q.
Let X = δZ + (1 − δ)Q, and then clearly Z is δ-dense in X. Moreover, X and Y are (s, ε)-
indistinguishable due to the indistinguishability between M and Z.
Therefore, all the three notions, pseudo, HILL-1 and HILL-2 relative-min entropies are all
equivalent up to some parameter losses in the classical case.
5.3 Impossibility of Quantum Dense Model Theorem
As discussed previously, HILL-1, HILL-2 and pseudo relative min-entropies are equivalent for clas-
sical distributions and the relative entropy bound is logarithmic. In this section we will show a
separation between the DHILL-1 and DHILL-2 relative min-entropies for quantum states. More specif-
ically, we show that there exist quantum states ρ and σ such that DHILL-1(ρ‖σ) < log(1/δ) but
DHILL-2(ρ‖σ) =∞. To this end, we use the language of Dense Model theorem.
We first define the notion of density for quantum states.
Definition 5.11 (δ-dense). Suppose 0 < δ ≤ 1. A quantum state σ ∈ Dens (H) is δ-dense in
another quantum state ρ ∈ Dens (H) if σ ≤ 1δρ.
By Definitions 5.11 and 2.1, saying σ is δ-dense in ρ is equivalent to saying that σ has relative
min-entropy at most log(1/δ) with respect to ρ. Note that if σ and ρ are classical distributions,
Definition 5.11 matches the classical definition.
To be consistent with the classical notation, ρX , ρY , ρZ and ρM are different quantum states
in the same space Dens
(
C
N
)
. Recall the Dense Model Theorem statement and what the coun-
terexample should achieve to show the non-existence of Quantum Dense Model Theorem. Suppose
ρX and ρY are two computationally indistinguishable quantum states and ρZ is a quantum state
that is δ-dense in ρX . A Quantum Dense Model Theorem would imply that there exists ρM that is
δ-dense in ρY and indistinguishable from ρZ . However, we show that this is false by constructing
ρX , ρY , and ρZ such that for every ρM that is δ-dense in ρY , it can be distinguished from ρ
Z .
Our counterexample is based on the following two observations: 1) the only state that is dense
in a pure state is the pure state itself; 2) there exists a pseudorandom pure state (Theorem 3.6).
The following theorem says that a Quantum Dense Model Theorem does not exist.
Theorem 5.12. Given s, ε > 0, for 0 < δ < 1 − 4ε, integers m1,m2 > O(log(s/ε), and
n = m1 + m2, there exist quantum states ρ
X , ρY , ρZ ∈ Dens (C2n) such that Hmin(X)ρX =
m1,Hmin(Y )ρY = m2, ρ
Z is δ-dense in ρX , and ρX , ρY are (s, ε)-indistinguishable, but for every
quantum state ρM which is δ-dense in ρY , there exists a constant-size quantum distinguisher A
such that
∣∣E [A(ρM )]− E [A(ρZ)]∣∣ > ε.
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Proof. We first have the following two claims:
Claim 1. Suppose |ψ〉 ∈ Ball (H1) and ρ ∈ Dens (H2). Let 0 < δ ≤ 1. Then a density operator in
Dens
(
C
M ⊗ CN) that is δ-dense in |ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ ρ must be of the form |ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ σ, where σ is δ-dense
in ρ.
proof of Claim. Let ρ =
∑
i pi |ψi〉〈ψi | be the spectral decomposition of ρ. Then |ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ ρ =∑
i pi |ψ,ψi〉〈ψ,ψi |, where |ψ,ψi〉 = |ψ〉⊗|ψi〉 for short. Suppose σ′ =
∑
(i) qi |φi〉〈φi | ∈ Dens (H1 ⊗H2)
is δ-dense in |ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ ρ. Assume that qj > 0 and TrH2 (|φj〉〈φj |) 6= |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Let |v〉 = |φj 〉−〈ψ,ψi|φj〉|ψ,ψi〉‖|φj 〉−〈ψ,ψi|φj〉|ψ,ψi〉‖ , which is a unit vector orthogonal to |ψ,ψl〉 for all l but not
|φj〉. Then 〈v| σ′ |v〉 ≥ qj > 0 but 〈v| (|ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ ρ) |v〉 = 0, which contradicts the assumption that
σ′ ≤ 1δ |ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ ρ for δ > 0.
Claim 2. Let ρ1 ∈ Dens
(
C
2m1
)
and ρ2 ∈ Dens
(
C
2m2
)
be two pure quantum states that are (s, ε)-
pseudorandom. Then ρ1 ⊗ σ(m1)mix and σ(m2)mix ⊗ ρ2 are (s−O(max{m1,m2}), 2ε)-indistinguishable.
proof of Claim. Since it only takes O(m2) many ancilla qubits and O(m2) many Hadamard gates to
prepare a maximally mixed state, ρ1⊗σ(m2)mix and σ(m1)mix ⊗σ(m2)mix are (s−O(m2), ε)-indistinguishable.
Similarly, σ
(m1)
mix ⊗ ρ2 and σ(m1)mix ⊗ σ(m2)mix are (s − O(m1), ε)-indistinguishable from σ(m1)mix ⊗ σ(m2)mix .
Therefore, ρ1 ⊗ σ(m2)mix and σ(m1)mix ⊗ ρ2 are (s − O(max{m1,m2}), 2ε)-indistinguishable from each
other.
By Claim 2, there exist ρX = σ
(m1)
mix ⊗ ρ2 and ρY = ρ1 ⊗ σ(m2)mix that are (s, ε)-indistinguishable
where ρ1 and ρ2 are pure pseudorandom states. Thus the entropies of ρ
X and ρY are m1 and m2,
respectively.
Denote τ0 =
1
2m1−1
|0〉〈0| ⊗ id2m1−1 and τ1 = 12m1−1 |1〉〈1| ⊗ id2m1−1 . Let
ρZ =
(
min
{
1,
1
2δ
}
τ0 +max
{
0, 1 − 1
2δ
}
τ1
)
⊗ ρ2.
Then ρZ is δ-dense in ρX . By Claim 1, for every ρM that is δ-dense in ρY , ρM must be of the form
ρ1 ⊗ σ2 for σ2 ∈ Dens
(
C
2m2
)
.
Now we define a quantum distinguisher A with BPOVM Π = |0〉〈0| ⊗ id2m1−1 ⊗ id2m2 . Thus
E
[
A(ρZ)
]
=
〈
Π, ρZ
〉
= min {1, 1/2δ} > 1
2
+ 2ε.
On the other hand, since ρ1 is (s, ε) pseudorandom,
E
[
A(ρM )
]
=
〈
Π, ρM
〉
= 〈|0〉〈0| ⊗ id2m1−1 , ρ1〉 ≤
1
2
+ ε.
Therefore, the quantum distinguisher A is as desired.
Corollary 5.13. Given s ∈ N , ε > 0, for 0 < δ < 1ε and n > O(log(s/ε)), there exist quantum
states ρ, σ ∈ Dens (C2n) such that DHILL-2s,ε (ρ‖σ) < log(1/δ) but DHILL-1O(1),O(1)(ρ‖σ) =∞.
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6 Computational Leakage Chain Rule
In this section, we will prove the leakage chain rule for quantum relaxed-HILL pseudoentropy
with quantum leakage. First, we recall the statement of the classical leakage chain rule [DP08].
Suppose there is a joint distribution (X,Z,B) (which will be a quantum state ρXZB in the quantum
setting) where X, Z and B are viewed as a source, prior knowledge, and leakage, respectively. The
leakage chain rule says that, if the pseudoentropy of X conditioned on Z is at least k, then the
pseudoentropy of X conditioned on both Z and B retains at least k− ℓ, where ℓ is the length of B.
In the asymptotic setting, we will focus on the case that the leakage B is small (O(log κ) qubits)
and the length of X and Z could be poly(κ) bits, where κ is the security parameter. The leakage
chain rule cannot hold when B is too long. For example, assume the existence of one-way function.
Let X = G(B) where B is a uniform distribution and G is a pseudorandom generator, and Z is
empty. Then X has a full HILL entropy, while X|B has zero.
If there is no prior knowledge Z and |B| = O(log n), then HILL pseudoentropy and relaxed-HILL
pseudoentropy are equivalent. If prior information Z is allowed, Krenn et al. [KPW13] showed that
the leakage lemma is unlikely to hold for standard HILL pseudoentropy. Specifically, assuming the
existence of a perfect binding commitment scheme, they constructed random variables X,Z, and B,
where B is a single random bit, such that HHILL(X|Z) ≥ n, but HHILL(X|Z,B) ≤ 1. On the other
hand, we know that the leakage chain rule holds for classical relaxed-HILL pseudoentropy [DP08,
RTTV08, GW11]. Therefore, as a first-step study, we aim for proving a quantum leakage chain
rule for relaxed-HILL pseudoentropy.
One main obstacle of proving the leakage chain rule for quantum entropies is that, contrary to
the classical case, we cannot consider a probability conditioned on a fixed leakage b (i.e., Pr[X|B =
b]) which blocks the possibility of handling cases with different b separately. In fact, various proofs
of the chain rule for entropies (e.g., [CKLR11, JP14]) rely on this property, including both HILL
and relaxed-HILL entropies. Eventually, we adopt the proof via the Leakage Simulation Lemma.
Leakage Simulation Lemma. The leakage simulation lemma says that given a joint distribu-
tion (X,B), there is a simulator circuit C of small complexity such that (X,B) and (X,C(X))
are indistinguishable. As we will show in Section 6.1, this lemma immediately implies Gentry
and Wichs’ simulation lemma [GW11] and hence the chain rule. Those lemmas also have other
interesting applications (e.g., [GW11, CLP15, TTV09]).
Theorem 6.1. Let ρXB =
∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB ∈ {0, 1}n × Dens
(
C
2ℓ
)
be a cq-state with n
classical bits and ℓ qubits. For any s ∈ N and ε > 0, there exists a quantum circuit C : {0, 1}n →
Dens
(
C
2ℓ
)
of size s′ = poly(s, n, 2ℓ, 1/ε) such that the cq-state
∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x|⊗C(x) and ρXB
are (s, ε)-indistinguishable.
There are two ways to prove the quantum simulation leakage lemma: one is based on the boost-
ing (multiplicative weight update) technique, and the other is via the (nonuniform) Min-max Theo-
rem. We illustrate the former in the main body (Section 6.2) and leave the latter in Appendix B. In
both proofs, the techniques that we need to convert a given circuit into its corresponding BPOVM,
called quantum tomography, are detailed in Appendix A.
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6.1 Leakage Chain Rule
Theorem 6.2. For any n,m, ℓ, s′ ∈ N and ε > 0, the following holds for s = poly(s′, n, 2ℓ, 1/ε) and
ε′ = O(ε). Let ρXZB =
∑
(x,z)∈{0,1}n+m pxz |x〉〈x| ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ ρxzB be a ccq-state with n+m classical
bits and ℓ qubits. If H rHILLs,ε (X|Z) ≥ k, then we have H rHILLs′,ε′ (X|Z,B) ≥ k − ℓ.
Proof. We use the following lemma as an intermediate step to derive the Leakage Chain Rule.
Lemma 6.3 (Generalization of [GW11] Lemma 3.2). For any n, ℓ, s′ ∈ N and ε > 0, the following
holds for s = poly(s′, n, 2ℓ, 1/ε) and ε′ = O(ε). Let ρXB =
∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB be a cq-state
with n classical bits and ℓ qubits. For every Y that is (s, ε)-indistinguishable from X, there exists
a (possibly inefficient) quantum circuit C such that the cq-state
ρY C =
∑
y∈{0,1}n
qy |y〉〈y| ⊗ C(y)
and ρXB are (s
′, ε′)-quantum-indistinguishable where qy = Pr [Y = y].
proof of Lemma 6.3. By Theorem 6.1, there exists a circuit C : {0, 1}n → Dens
(
C
2ℓ
)
with size
t = s′+poly(s′, n, 2ℓ, 1/ε) such that ρXB and ρXC(X) are (s′, ε)-indistinguishable. Set s = 2t. Since
X and Y are (s, ε)-indistinguishable,
∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ C(x) and
∑
y∈{0,1}n qy |y〉〈y| ⊗ C(y)
are (s − t = t, ε)-indistinguishable. By the transitivity of indistinguishability, ρXB and ρY C are
(min{s′, t} = s′, 2ε)-indistinguishable.
Once we have Lemma 6.3, we can derive the chain rule for quantum relaxed HILL entropy from
the chain rule of quantum min-entropy. Since ρXZB s a ccq-state, which is separable in on the
space (X ⊗ Z)⊗ B, losing only ℓ bits HILL entropy instead of 2ℓ as in Theorem 2.10 is possible.
H rHILL(X|Z) ≥ k implies there exists a joint distribution (Y,Z ′) such that (Y,Z ′) and (X,Z) are
(s, ε)-indistinguishable and Hmin(Y |Z ′) ≥ k. By Lemma 6.3, there exists an ℓ-qubit quantum sys-
tem C such that (X,Z,B) and (Y,Z ′, C) are (s′, ε′)-indistinguishable where s = poly(s′, n, 2ℓ, 1/ε)
and ε′ = O(ε). By the chain rule of quantum min-entropy (Theorem 2.10), Hmin(Y |Z ′, C) ≥ k− ℓ,
which implies H rHILL(X|Z,B)s′,ε′ ≥ k − ℓ.
We have proved the quantum leakage chain rule for ccq-states. However, due to some barriers
that we will mention in Section 8 and other obstacles, it is still open for the cqq-state case (the
prior knowledge Z is quantum). The quantum leakage chain rule for cqq-states is desired because
it might help one to improve the leakage-resilient protocol [DP08] to be secure against a quantum
leakage.
Open Problem 6.4. Let ρXBZ =
∑
(x)∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxBZ be a cqq-state with n classical bits
and ℓ+m qubits. If H rHILLs,ε (X|Z) ≥ k, can we show that H rHILLs′,ε′ (X|Z,B) ≥ k − ℓ for some s′ =
poly(s, n, 2ℓ, 1/ε)) and ε′ = O(ε)?
On the other hand, it is not known whether quantum HILL and relaxed-HILL entropies are
equivalent, even for the case that B is a single qubit. Thus our result does not imply a chain rule
for quantum HILL entropies without prior knowledge.
Open Problem 6.5. Let ρXZ be a cq-state with n+ 1 qubits. If H
rHILL
s,ε (X|Z) ≥ k, can we show
that HHILLs′,ε′ (X|Z) ≥ k for some s′ = poly(s, n, 1/ε)) and ε′ = O(ε)?
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6.2 Leakage Simulation Lemma by MMWU
This section dedicates to a proof of the Leakage Simulation Lemma. In this proof, we generalize
the idea in [VZ13] to the quantum setting. The overview of the algorithm is as follows. We will
construct a simulator via MMWU method. Initially, the simulator outputs a maximally mixed
state. If there exists a distinguisher can distinguish the output from ρXB , we use the best (or
almost) distinguisher to update the simulator. Guaranteed by the MMWU method, we will get the
desired simulator within polynomially many rounds.
However, due to the fact that quantum circuits are random, we cannot only consider determin-
istic distinguishers that output {0, 1}. Therefore, we adopt other techniques and have the simulator
circuit much more complicated than in the classical setting. Roughly speaking, even though we
cannot hope for the quantum circuits being deterministic, we can make it output the same result
with high probability if we repeat more times and randomly shift the estimations.
In the following proof, we will picture the idea of building the simulator via Procedure 6.1
and its approximation version, Procedure 6.2. Those procedures are merely the abstracts for the
simulator and do not handle the circuit complexity issue. Then we will show how to construct the
simulator circuit in Procedure 6.3.
Proof. Let d = 2ℓ be the dimension of the quantum space. Recall that we can use a d by d BPOVM
matrix to describe a quantum distinguisher on Dens
(
C
d
)
. Follow the same idea, we can also use
a set of d by d BPOVM matrices {Πx}x∈{0,1}n where Πx is the BPOVM matrix of the quantum
circuit A(x, ·) to characterize a quantum distinguisher of domain {0, 1}n ⊗Dens (Cd). As a result,
for an cq-state ρXB =
∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB ∈ {0, 1}n ⊗Dens
(
C
d
)
, we have
E [A(ρXB)] =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
px E [A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)] =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
px 〈Πx, ρxB〉 = E
x∼X
[〈Πx, ρxB〉] .
First, we consider the following MMWU procedure for a given x.
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Procedure 6.1
Input: x ∈ {0, 1}n and an error parameter ε > 0
Output: A quantum state σ ∈ Dens (Cd)
1. Choosing T = O(log d/ε2) and η =
√
ln d/T .
2. Initially, let W
(1)
x = idd.
3. For t = 1, . . . , T ,
(a) Let σ
(t)
x =W
(t)
x /Tr
(
W
(t)
x
)
.
(b) Let A(t) be the best s-size distinguisher in distinguishing ρXB and∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x . Namely,
A(t) = argmax
A of size s
E
x∼X
[A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)]− E
x∼X
[
A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x )
]
.
(c) Denote the corresponding BPOVM matrices of A(t) to be {Π(t)x }x∈{0,1}n , then
define the loss matrix
L(t)x = E
x∼X
[〈
Π(t)x , ρ
x
B
〉]
idd −Π(t)x .
(d) Let W
(t+1)
x =W
(t)
x · exp
(
−ηL(t)x
)
.
4. Output σx =
1
T
∑T
t=1 σ
(t)
x .
Claim 3. Let {σx}x∈{0,1}n be the states obtained from Procedure 6.1. Then for every quantum
distinguisher A of size s, we have
E [A (ρXB)]− E
A
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σx
 ≤ ε
proof of Claim 3. By Theorem 2.11, for any τ ∈ Dens (Cd)
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
σ(t)x , L
(t)
x
〉
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
τ, L(t)x
〉
+ ε
when T is properly chosen. Particularly, if we take τ = ρxB , we get
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
σ(t)x , L
(t)
x
〉
≤ E
x∼X
[〈
Π(t)x , ρ
x
B
〉]
−
〈
Π(t)x , ρ
x
B
〉
+ ε. (6.1)
By the definitions of A(t) and L
(t)
x , for any algorithm distinguisher A,
E
x∼X
[A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)]−A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x ) ≤ E
x∼X
[
A(t)(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)
]
−A(t)(|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x )
≤
〈
σ(t)x , L
(t)
x
〉
.
(6.2)
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Let σx =
1
T
∑T
t=1 σ
(t)
x . Combine Equation (6.1) and (6.2), and take the expectation over x from X,
we get
E [A (ρXB)]− E
A
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σx

=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
px · 1
T
T∑
t=1
(
E
x∼X
[A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)]−A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x )
)
≤ ε.
In Protocol 6.1, one cannot easily obtain the precise BPOVM matrices Πtx from A
(t). First, it
needs a quantum tomography technique to get BPOVM form of a distinguisher given the distin-
guisher (as a circuit or an oracle). Usually, the technique evolves sampling, so one cannot get a
deterministic result. Second, due to the precision issue, one cannot hope to store or have a circuit
outputs the precise BPOVM matrices. In the following procedure, we address the second concern.
We will show that, approximations of the BPOVM matrices (even themselves are not valid BPOVM
matrices) suffice for building a simulator.
Procedure 6.2
Input: x ∈ {0, 1}n and an error parameter ε > 0
Output: A quantum state σ ∈ Dens (Cd)
1. Choosing T = O(log d/ε2) and η =
√
ln d/T .
2. Initially, let W
(1)
x = idd.
3. For t = 1, . . . , T ,
(a) Let σ
(t)
x =W
(t)
x /Tr
(
W
(t)
x
)
.
(b) Let A(t) be the best s-size distinguisher in distinguishing ρXB and∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)(x). Namely,
A(t) = argmax
A of size s
E
x∼X
[A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)]− E
x∼X
[
A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x )
]
.
(c) Denote the corresponding BPOVM matrices of A(t) to be
{
Π
(t)
x
}
x∈{0,1}n
. Let
Π˜
(t)
x be a matrix such that
∥∥∥Π(t)x − Π˜(t)x ∥∥∥
op
≤ ε/4, then define the loss matrix
L˜(t)x = E
x∼X
[〈
Π˜(t)x , ρ
x
B
〉]
idd − Π˜(t)x .
(d) Let W
(t+1)
x =W
(t)
x · exp
(
−ηL˜(t)x
)
.
4. Output σx =
1
T
∑T
t=1 σ
(t)
x .
Claim 4. Let {σx}x∈{0,1}n be the states obtained from Procedure 6.2. Then for every quantum
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distinguisher A of size s, we have
E [A (ρXB)]− E
A
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σx
 ≤ ε.
proof of Claim 4. Since
∥∥∥Π(t)x − Π˜(t)x ∥∥∥
op
≤ ε/4, we have − ε4 idd ≤ Π˜
(t)
x ≤
(
1 + ε4
)
idd and so − ε4 idd ≤
L˜
(t)
x ≤
(
2 + ε4
)
idd for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, t ∈ [T ]. By Theorem 2.11, for any τ ∈ Dens
(
C
d
)
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
σ(t)x , L˜
(t)
x
〉
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
τ, L˜(t)x
〉
+
ε
2
when T is properly chosen. Particularly, if we take τ = ρxB , we get
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
σ(t)x , L˜
(t)
x
〉
≤ E
x∼X
[〈
Π(t)x , ρ
x
B
〉]
−
〈
Π(t)x , ρ
x
B
〉
+
ε
2
. (6.3)
By the definitions of A(t) and L˜
(t)
x , for any algorithm distinguisher A,
E
x∼X
[A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)]−A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x ) ≤ E
x∼X
[
A(t)(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)
]
−A(t)(|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x )
= E
x∼X
[〈
Π(t)x , ρ
x
B
〉]
−
〈
Π(t)x , σ
(t)
x
〉
≤ E
x∼X
[〈
Π˜(t)x , ρ
x
B
〉]
−
〈
Π˜(t)x , σ
(t)
x
〉
+ 2 · ε
4
=
〈
σ(t)x , L
(t)
x
〉
+
ε
2
.
(6.4)
Let σx =
1
T
∑T
t=1 σ
(t)
x . Combining Equation (6.3) and (6.4), and taking the expectation over x from
X, we get
E [A (ρXB)]− E
A
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σx

=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
px · 1
T
T∑
t=1
(
E
x∼X
[A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)]−A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x )
)
≤ε
2
+
ε
2
= ε.
Based on Procedure 6.2, we are going to build a small circuit C : {0, 1}n → Dens (Cd) such
that C(x) will output approximates σx with high probability. Intuitively, to calculate Π˜
(t)
x , one
can simply use a tomography algorithm (see Appendix A) to obtain an approximation matrix Π˜x.
However, as mentioned before, the circuit is not deterministic, that means A(t) depends on Π˜
(t−1)
x
and we cannot afford to hardwire all possibilities of A(t). To deal with that, after finishing an
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tomography algorithm, we shift each entry (both real and imaginary parts) a small amount, and
round up to certain precision. If there exists a shift such that with high probability, each number
uniquely round to a number, then the tomography algorithm will output the same result with high
probability. Concretely, we consider the following circuit.
Procedure 6.3
Input: x ∈ {0, 1}n and an error parameter ε > 0
Output: A quantum state σ ∈ Dens (Cd)
1. Choosing T = O(log d/ε2) and let η =
√
ln d/T , ∆ = 24d2T/ε.
2. Let δ ∈ [∆] be a nonuniform advice for the circuit.
3. Initially, let C(1)(x) = idd.
4. For t = 1, . . . , T ,
(a) Let σ
(t)
x = C(t)(x)/Tr
(
C(t)(x)
)
.
(b) Let A(t) be the best s-size distinguisher in distinguishing ρXB and∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)(x). Namely,
A(t) = argmax
A of size s
E
x∼X
[A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB)]− E
x∼X
[
A(|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ(t)x )
]
.
(c) Let the circuit C
A(t)(x,·)
tom be the circuit do the following.
i. Solve the quantum tomography problem (Definition 2.12)
QCkt-Tomography(s, d, ε/16d, ε/4T ) for the distinguisher A(t)(x, ·)
and get the approximation matrix M
(t)
x (The problem and the algorithms
are defined in Appendix A.
ii. Add δ∆ · ε16d (1+ i) to the entries in upper triangle and δ∆ · ε16d (1− i) to ones
in lower triangle in M and round each number to closest multiple of ε/16d.
iii. Output the result matrix as Π˜
(t)
x .
(d) Calculate the matrix
L˜(t)x = E
x∼X
[〈
Π˜(t)x , ρ
x
B
〉]
idd − Π˜(t)x .
(e) Let C(t+1)(x) = C(t)(x) · exp
(
−ηL˜(t)x
)
.
5. Based on the descriptions of quantum states C(t)(x), output an ε/4-approximation
of σx =
1
T
∑T
t=1 σ
(t)
x .
Claim 5. For a fixed x, if we randomly sample δ from 1, . . . ,∆, then with probability at least 1−ε/2
over the choice of δ and the executions of the circuits C
A(t)(x,·)
tom for t = 1, . . . , T , for each t, the
output matrices Π
(t)
x is fixed and
∥∥∥Π˜(t)x −Π(t)x ∥∥∥
op
≤ ε/4 where Π(t)x is the BPOVM matrix of the
distinguisher A(t)(x, ·).
proof of Claim 5. Assume that
∥∥∥M (t)x −Π(t)x ∥∥∥
max
≤ ε/16d. After shifting every number of M (t)x
with the amount at most ε/16d and rounding every number to a closest multiple of ε/16d to get
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Π˜
(t)
x , we have
∥∥∥M (t)x − Π˜(t)x ∥∥∥
max
≤ 2√2ε/16d, so
∥∥∥Π˜(t)x −Π(t)x ∥∥∥
max
≤ ε/4d. Then by Equation (2.4),∥∥∥Π˜(t)x −Π(t)x ∥∥∥
op
≤ ε/4.
Now we show that, conditioned on M
(t)
x and Π
(t)
x are entry-wise close, with high probability
over the the shifting, the output of C
A(t)(x,·)
tom is fixed. Observe that, for a given number, if we shift
the amount δ∆
ε
16d where δ is uniformly and randomly chosen from 1, . . . ,∆. Then the probability
that it locates less than 1∆
ε
16d distance to some multiple of
ε
16d is at most 3/∆ ≤ ε/8d2T .
In the procedure, we do the shifting and rounding for 2 ·d2T real numbers. By the union bound,
with probability at least 1 − ε
8d2T
· 2d2T = 1 − ε/4 over choosing the shifting, every number will
end up to a fixed value (since they all are far from multiples of ε16d).
Recall that the tomography algorithm also only guarantee that with probability 1 − ε/4T , we
have
∥∥∥M (t)x −Π(t)x ∥∥∥
max
≤ ε/16d. Again, union bound this two events, we have the claim.
From the above claim, we know that a random shifting works for a fixed x with probability at
least 1− ε/2. Simply by an averaging argument, we know there exists a shift δ such that it works
for x with probability at least 1− ε/2 when x is chosen from the distribution X. Let W be the set
of all x that the shift δ works. Now we can apply Claim 4 with parameter ε/4,
E [A (ρXB)]− E
A
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σx

≤Pr [A (ρXB) = 1 ∧ x ∈W ]− Pr
A
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σx
 = 1 ∧ x ∈W
+ Pr [x /∈W ]
≤ε/2 + ε/4 = 3ε/4.
Eventually, the trace distance between the quantum states outputted by the circuit C(x) and σx
is at most ε/4. Then,
E [A (ρXB)]− E
A
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
px |x〉〈x| ⊗ C(x)

≤E [A (ρXB)]− E
A
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
px |x〉〈x| ⊗ σx)
+ ε
4
≤3ε/4 + ε/4 = ε.
By Lemma 2.13, the size of the circuit C
A(t)(x,·)
tom is at most poly(s, d, ε/16d, log(ε/4T )) =
poly(s, d, 1/ε). The circuit C
A(t)(x,·)
tom is executed T = O(log d/ε
2) times. In the final step, the
quantum state can be constructed from its description by a circuit of size polynomial in its descrip-
tion length and dimension [SBM05]. Summarily, the complexity of the circuit C is poly(s, d, 1/ε) =
poly(s, 2ℓ, 1/ε).
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Remark 6.6. We can also consider the leakage chain rule in the model that quantum distinguishers
are given quantum advice. The same proof is still applicable as long as the simulator is allowed
to have a quantum advice, since the only place that we need a quantum advice is that we use
distinguishers A(t) as an advice when constructing the simulator.
7 Application to Quantum Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
Classically, important applications of the Leakage Simulation Lemma and the Leakage Chain Rule
are to Leakage-Resilient Cryptography, which aims to construct secure cryptographic protocols
even if side information about the honest parties’ secrets leak to an adversary. For instance, the
security of leakage-resilient stream cipher based on any weak pseudorandom function (weak PRF)
was proved using the classical Leakage Simulation Lemma [Pie09, JP14], and the security of the
construction based on a pseudorandom generator (PRG) was proved by the classical Leakage Chain
Rule [DP08].
Here, we apply our Quantum Leakage Simulation Lemma to obtain a stream-cipher that is secure
against quantum adversaries that can get quantum leakage as well as classical leakage, provided that
the adversary has bounded quantum storage. (The classical storage of the adversary is unbounded.)
The construction is the same as in [DP08] but instantiated with a PRG secure against quantum
adversaries with quantum advice. Several issues arise when we generalize the classical proofs to
handle quantum leakage. In particular, we do not know how to prove the security of the weak PRF-
based construction of [Pie09] or the security against general quantum adversaries (with unbounded
quantum storage). Furthermore, our proof generalizes the classical proof of [JP14], but with certain
necessary modifications to make the proof go through in the quantum setting. We discuss the issues
we encounter after describing the construction of [DP08].
7.1 Quantum Leakage-resilient Stream Cipher
In this section, we generalize the leakage-resilient stream-cipher defined in [DP08] to capture quan-
tum leakage in the bounded-quantum-storage model. We first review the classical model informally.
A stream-cipher is given by a function SC : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m×{0, 1}n. Suppose the initial internal
state is S(0) ∈ {0, 1}m. In the i-th round, (S(i),X(i)) = SC(S(i−1)) is computed. When we recur-
sively apply the function SC, the internal state evolves and generates the output X(1),X(2), . . . .
Informally, a stream cipher SC is secure if for all i, X(i) is pseudorandom given X(1), . . . ,X(i−1).
Classical Leakage-resilient Stream Cipher Recall that for classical leakage-resilient stream
cipher, at round i, the adversary learns not only the output X(i) but also some bounded length
leakage about the internal state S(i−1) that used for generating X(i). More precisely, the security
is captured by the following game. Suppose the adversary’s memory right before round i is V (i−1),
which could contain all the leakages and outputs ahead this round and any information that can be
inferred from them. Also a leakage function f (i) 5 with range at most ℓ bits is already chosen by the
adversary. During round i, when (S(i),X(i)) = SC(S(i−1)) is computed, the adversary A can learn
some leakage information Λ(i) = f (i)(Sˆ(i−1)) where Sˆ(i−1) denotes the part of S(i−1) that is used for
evaluating SC(S(i−1)) (namely, following the “only computation leak” model [MR04]). We say the
stream cipher is (s, ε, q, ℓ)-secure if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ q, no distinguisher of size s can distinguish X(i)
5Here we use f (i) to denote a leakage function used in the i-th round, but not applying the function i times.
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from a uniformly random string with advantage more than ε before round i (before seeing X(i) and
the leakage Λ(i) of length at most ℓ) with advantage more than ε.
Bounded-quantum-storage Model In the classical case, there is no restriction on the size of
adversary’s memory, while in the bounded quantum storage model, we assume the adversary has
an ℓ-qubit quantum memory. Here we choose ℓ to be same as the maximal length of a leakage in
each round for convenience. We use (V (i−1), τ (i−1)) ∈ {0, 1}∗⊗Dens
(
C
2ℓ
)
to represent the memory
state after round (i− 1).
The game in the quantum setting is different from the classical setting in the following way.
At round i, the adversary receives an ℓi-qubit leakage according to the leakage function f
(i) where
ℓi ≤ ℓ. (Recall that f (i) can be chosen adaptively, so it can be correlated to (V (i−1), τ (i−1)). Also,
(V (i−1), τ (i−1)) is the memory state after the f (i) is decided.) We use τ[j] to denote the quantum
state in the first j bits system. Namely, the last ℓ− j qubits of τ are traced out. If we write a state
τ as
τ = τY Z ∈ Dens (Y ⊗ Z) = Dens
(
C
2ℓ−ℓ
′
⊗C2ℓ
′)
,
then τ[ℓ′] = TrZ (τ). Suppose λ(i) = f (i)(Sˆ(i−1)) is the (quantum) leakage in the i-th round. After
receiving the leakage, the adversary replaces the last ℓi qubits in its quantum memory by λ
(i). The
memory state then becomes ((V (i−1),X(i)), τ (i−1)[ℓ−ℓi] ⊗ λ(i)). Next, the adversary prepare the leakage
function f (i+1) for the next round, and the memory state becomes (V (i), τ (i)).
Now we define a security game Gq0 between a stream cipher SC and an adversary A.
1. Initially, the cipher randomly generates a secret state S(0) ∈ {0, 1}m. Adversary A
generates the leakage function f (1). Let adversary’s memory state be (V (0), τ (0)).
2. For i = 1, . . . , q − 1
(a) (S(i),X(i)) = SC(S(i−1)), where S(i) is the new secret state, and X(i) is the
output at round i.
(b) An ℓi-qubit quantum leakage λ
(i) = fi(Sˆ
(i−1)) where ℓi ≤ ℓ is given to the ad-
versary. Sˆ(i−1) denotes the part of S(i−1) that is used for evaluating SC(S(i−1)).
(c) After seeing X(i) and placing λ(i) in the last ℓi qubits of quantum memory, the
adversary’s memory state becomes ((V (i−1),X(i)), τ (i−1)[ℓ−ℓ′] ⊗ λ(i)).
(d) Adversary produces the leakage function f (i+1) for the next round. The memory
state becomes (V (i), τ (i)).
3. (S(q),X(q)) = SC(S(q−1)).
4. The adversary A is given X(q) and outputs a bit.
We use A(G) to denote the output of the adversary A in a game G. The game G implicitly
depends on the stream cipher SC. Also, we say two games G1 and G2 are ε-indistinguishable by A
if ∣∣∣Pr [A(G1) = 1]− Pr [A(G2) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
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To define the security of a stream cipher, we also consider the game G˜q0, which is identical to the
game Gq0, except X
(q) is replaced by a uniform random string with a same length at the end. Now
we are ready to define the security of a quantum leakage-resilient stream cipher:
Definition 7.1. A quantum leakage-resilient stream cipher SC : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n is
(s, ε, q, ℓ)-secure in the bounded quantum storage model if for every quantum adversary A of size s
with an ℓ-qubit memory and every q′ ∈ [q], Gq′0 and G˜q
′
0 are ε-indistinguishable by A. Namely∣∣∣Pr [A(Gq′0 ) = 1]− Pr [A(G˜q′0 ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
7.2 Construction
The construction follows the one in [DP08]. First, we define a function F : {0, 1}k+n → {0, 1}k+n,
which serves as a building block of the construction.
F (K,X) = Prg(Ext(K,X),X)
where Ext : {0, 1}k+n → {0, 1}m is a quantum-proof strong randomness extractor (e.g., Trevisan’s
extractor [Tre01, DPVR12]) and Prg : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}k+n is a pseudorandom generator secure
against quantum adversary. The existence of quantum-secure PRGs can base on the quantum
security of primitives implying PRG (e.g., lattice assumptions or quantum-secure one-way func-
tions) [Son14]. More specifically,
• Quantum-proof strong randomness extractor [DPVR12]:
We say Ext : {0, 1}k+n → {0, 1}m is an (kExt, εExt)-quantum-proof extractor if for all cq-state
ρKV with Hmin(K|V )ρ ≥ kExt, the trace distance between two ccq-state
(Ext(K,Un), Un, V ) and (Um, Un, V )
is at most εExt where m = kExt − 4 log(1/εExt) − O(1). Um and Un are uniform distribution
over m and n bits, respectively. (Two Uns in the first state are the same sample from a
uniform distribution.)
• Quantum-secure pseudorandom generator:
We say Prg : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n is an (sPrg, εPrg)∗-quantum-secure if for all quantum distin-
guisher A of size sPrg with quantum advice,∣∣∣Pr [A(Prg(Um)) = 1]− Pr [A(Un) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ εPrg.
Combine the properties of the extractor and the pseudorandom generator, we have the following
claim:
Claim 6. Let Ext : {0, 1}k+n → {0, 1}m be a (kExt, εExt)-quantum-proof extractor, Prg : {0, 1}m+n →
{0, 1}k+n be an (sPrg, εPrg)-quantum-secure and define F : {0, 1}k+n → {0, 1}k+n to be F (K,X) =
Prg(Ext(K,X),X). If a cq-state ρKV ∈ {0, 1}k ⊗ Dens (H) satisfies Hmin(K|V )ρ ≥ kExt, then for
all (sPrg)-size quantum distinguisher A, we have∣∣∣∣ PrX∼Un [A(F (K,X), V ) = 1]− Pr [A(Uk+n, V ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ εExt + εPrg.
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Proof. ∣∣∣∣ PrX∼Un [A(F (K,X), V ) = 1]− Pr [A(Uk+n, V ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ PrX∼Un [A(Prg(Ext(K,X),X), V ) = 1]− Pr [A(Uk+n, V ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ PrX∼Un [A(Prg(Um,X), V ) = 1]− Pr [A(Uk+n, V ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣+ εExt
≤εPrg + εExt.
The first inequality is because the trace distance between (Ext(K,X),X, V ) and (Um,X, V ) is at
most εExt. Applying a same function on two quantum states can only decrease the trace distance.
The second inequality is due to the property of the quantum-secure pseudorandom generator defined
above. Here V can be seen as a quantum advice.
Based on the function F , we define the q-round stream cipher SC as follows. Let S(i) =
(K(i),K(i+1),X(i)) where K(i) ∈ {0, 1}k ,X(i) ∈ {0, 1}n. Define
SC(S(i−1)) = (Si,Xi) = ((K(i),K(i+1),X(i)),X(i)) where (K(i+1),X(i)) = F (K(i−1),X(i−1)).
Note that we repeat X(i) in the internal state S(i) just to make the definition consistent with the
definition of stream cipher previously. Clearly, Ki is intact when calculating (S
(i),X(i)) from S(i−1),
so ˆS(i−1) = K(i−1).
Now we discuss the issues we encounter when we generalize the classical proofs of [DP08, Pie09,
JP14]. The main problem is that many steps of the proofs require conditioning on the value of the
leakage or the view of the adversary. Again, we cannot do such conditioning for a quantum state, and
this is reminiscent to the difficulty of proving that a randomness extractor is secure with quantum
side information. For example, the proofs of [DP08, Pie09] based on the Leakage Chain Rule
proceeds by conditioning on the value of the leakage in the previous rounds. Also, the construction
of [Pie09] relies on leakage-resilient weak PRFs, whose security proofs [Pie09, BDK+11] require
to condition on the value of the leakage.6 Also, we mention that the security proof of [Pie09] for
leakage-resilient weak PRF applies a gap application procedure to, which suffers our barrier result
in Section 8.
Fortunately, when we apply the proof of [JP14] based on the classical Leakage Simulation
Lemma to the construction of [DP08], and replace the classical lemma with our quantum Leakage
Simulation Lemma, we avoid most of the issues of such conditioning. Roughly speaking, the
Leakage Simulation Lemma allows us to simulate the leakage as an efficient function of the view
of the adversary without any conditioning. However, in one step of the proof we need to argue
that the extractor Ext(K(i),X(i)) can extract (pseudo)entropy from K(i) using seed X(i), which
requires to argue the independence of K(i) and X(i). The classical proof establishes independence
by conditioning on the view of the adversary [DP07]. However, such conditional independence
does not hold when the leakage becomes quantum. We resolve this issue by observing that the
independence can be established in the hybrids, which is sufficient to carry the proof.
6More precisely, they show that the output of the weak PRF remains pseudorandom when the key has sufficiently
high entropy, and use the fact that with high probability over the leakage value, the key conditioned on the leakage
value has high entropy.
40
Theorem 7.2. Let εExt = εPrg = ε/8q. There exists sPrg = poly(s, 2
ℓ, 1/ε, q, n, k) such that if
Prg : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}k+n is an (sPrg, εPrg)-quantum-secure pseudorandom generator and Ext :
{0, 1}k+n → {0, 1}m is an (εExt, k − ℓ)∗-quantum-proof extractor, then the above construction for
SC is a (s, ε, q, ℓ)-secure leakage-resilient stream cipher.
As one will see, the main reason that we can only handle the bounded-quantum-storage adver-
sary is that we do not have a simulation leakage lemma for a quantum source. We have to treat
the whole quantum state maintained by the adversary as a leakage.
Proof. Let sPrg = s + sSC + sg where sSC is the circuit size of the q-round stream cipher and
sg = poly(s, sSC, n, k, 2
ℓ, q, 1/ε) is the circuit size of a ”leakage simulator”, which will be defined
later. In this proof, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ q, X˜(i) and K˜(i) represent independent uniform distributions
over {0, 1}n and {0, 1}k , respectively.
We will define the hybrid games Gq0, G
q
0→1, G
q
1, . . . , G
q
q−1. Then show that a bounded adversary
cannot distinguish neighboring two games.
• From Gqi to Gqi→i+1
Gqi and G
q
i→i+1 are identical until round (i − 1). At round i of Gqi→i+1, after the adversary
queries f (i)(K˜(i−1)), its quantum memory becomes g(i)(V (i−1),X(i),K(i+1)) instead of τ (i−1)[ℓ−ℓi]⊗
f (i)(K˜(i−1)). Here g(i) is a quantum simulator of size sg = poly(s, sSC, n, k, q, 2ℓ, 1/ε) such
that(
V (i−1),X(i),K(i+1), τ (i−1)[ℓ−ℓi] ⊗ f
(i)(K˜(i−1))
)
and
(
V (i−1),X(i),K(i+1), g(i)(V (i−1),X(i),K(i+1))
)
are (sSC + s, ε/4q)-indistinguishable. The existence and the property of the simulator g
(i) is
by the Leakage Simulation Lemma. Specifically, treating the (V (i−1),X(i),K(i+1)) as X and
τ
(i−1)
[ℓ−ℓi] ⊗ f (i)(K˜
(i−1)) as B in Theorem 6.1, then we show the existence of g(i). Now we prove
that the games Gqi and G
q
i→i+1 are ε/4q-indistinguishable by any s-size quantum distinguisher
A.
Claim 7. For all s-size quantum distinguisher A,∣∣∣Pr [A(Gqi ) = 1]− Pr [A(Gqi→i+1) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε4q .
Proof. Let
Lqi =
(
V (i−1),X(i),K(i+1), τ (i−1)[ℓ−ℓi] ⊗ f
(i)(K˜(i−1))
)
and Lqi→i+1 =
(
V (i−1),X(i),K(i+1), g(i)(V (i−1),X(i),K(i+1))
)
.
Assuming there exists an s-size quantum distinguisher A for games Gqi and G
q
i→i+1, we define
the distinguisher A′ for Lqi and L
q
i→i+1. When the input is L
q
i (resp., G
q
i→i+1), the distinguisher
A′ emulates the game Gqi (resp., G
q
i→i+1) between SC and the adversary A starting from the
leakage in the i-th round, then output the decision of A. The state of the stream cipher
after round i is (X(i), K˜(i),K(i+1)). First two terms X(i) and K(i+1) are provided by both
Lqi and L
q
i→i+1, while K˜
(i) is merely an uniform string. For the adversary’s memory in both
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games, it can also be obtained from Lqi and L
q
i→i+1, respectively. Therefore, the size of the
distinguisher A′ is sSC + s. For such A′, we have∣∣∣Pr [A′(Lqi ) = 1]− Pr [A′(Lqi→i+1) = 1]∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Pr [A(Gqi ) = 1]− Pr [A(Gqi→i+1) = 1]∣∣∣ > ε4q ,
which contradicts the indistinguishability.
• From Gqi→i+1 to Gqi+1
We define the game Gi+1 from Gi→i+1 as follows. After step (b) at round i, the output X(i)
and part of the internal state K(i+1) are replaced by X˜(i) and K˜(i+1), respectively. Note that
the replacements lead to the following changes.
1. In the step (c) of round i, the adversary sees X˜(i) instead, so the classical part of the
memory becomes (V (i−1), X˜(i)) after the i-th leakage in Game Gi+1.
2. λ˜i in the above is also changed implicitly, since it depends on X
(i) and K(i+1). Namely,
λ˜(i) = gi(V
(i−1), X˜(i), K˜(i+1)).
3. At round (i+ 2) (if exists), λ(i+2) is also changed to f (i+2)(K˜(i+1)).
We prove the following claim.
Claim 8. For all s-size quantum distinguisher A,∣∣∣E [A(Gqi→i+1)]− E [A(Gqi+1)]∣∣∣ ≤ ε4q .
Proof. First, we argue that (K(i+1),X(i)) is pseudorandom in Gqi→i+1 against the adversary
right before the i-th leakage. The memory state of the adversary is (V (i−1), τ (i−1)) at that
moment. Recall that (K(i+1),X(i)) = F (K˜(i−1), X˜(i−1)) in Game Gqi→i+1 . As long as we can
argue that
1. (K˜(i−1), X˜(i−1)) are independent given V (i−1), τ (i−1) and
2. Hmin(K˜
(i−1)|V (i−1), τ (i−1)) ≥ k − ℓ,
then we can apply Claim 6 to prove that (K(i+1),X(i)) is (sPrg, ε/4q)-pseudorandom given
(V (i−1), τ (i−1)).
For the first condition, we notice that before round i, K˜(i−1) was only used by the simulator
g(i−2), so it is correlated to (V (i−2), τ (i−2)). On the other hand, (V (i−1), τ (i−1)) is decided
from both (V (i−2), τ (i−2)) and X˜(i−1), which is generated after the adversary’s memory state
became (V (i−2), τ (i−2)). Therefore, conditioned on (V (i−1), τ (i−1)), X˜i−1 and K˜i−1 are inde-
pendent.
To show the second condition, clearly K˜i−1 is uniform and has entropy k before seeing any
leakage related to K˜i−1. Before the i-th round, the only information about K˜i−1 learned
by an adversary is g(i−2)(X˜(i−3), X˜(i−2), K˜i−1). After some operations on the leakage, the
conditional entropy of K˜(i−1) can only increase. Therefore,
Hmin(K˜
(i−1)|V (i−1), τ (i−1)) ≥ Hmin(K˜i−1|g(i−2)(X˜(i−3), X˜(i−2), K˜i−1)) ≥ k − ℓ.
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The last inequality is from Lemma 2.10 and the fact that the length of g(i−2)(X˜(i−3), X˜(i−2), K˜i−1)
is at most ℓ.
So far we have shown that (K(i+1),X(i)) and (K˜(i+1), X˜(i)) are (sPrg, ε/4q)-indistinguishable
conditioned on (V (i−1), τ (i−1)). Assume there exists an s-size quantum distinguisher A to
distinguish the games Gqi→i+1 and G
q
i+1 with advantage more than ε/4q. Then we can
construct an distinguisher A′ of size sPrg to distinguish (K(i+1),X(i), V (i−1), τ (i−1)) from
(K˜(i+1), X˜(i), V (i−1), τ (i−1)) with the same advantage. Namely,∣∣∣Pr [A′(K(i+1),X(i)) = 1]− Pr [A′(K˜(i+1), X˜(i)) = 1]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr [A(Gqi→i+1) = 1]− Pr [A(Gqi+1) = 1]∣∣∣ > ε/4q.
Now we calculate the circuit size of A′. The distinguisher A′ emulates the game G between
SC and the adversary A starting from the leakage in the i-th round, and output A’s decision.
The state of the stream cipher after the i-th leakage is (X(i), K˜(i),K(i+1)). The terms X(i)
and K(i+1) (or X˜(i) and K˜(i+1)) are given as inputs of A′, and K˜(i) is merely an uniform
string. For the adversary’s memory in both games, it is also provided by the input. In order
to provide the simulated leakage in the i-th round, (since the leakage function f (i) is replaced
by g(i)), we have to run the simulation circuit g(i). To sum up, the size of A′ is at most
s+ sSC + sg = sPrg, which contradicts the pseudorandomness of (K
(i+1),X(i)).
We have shown that both Gqi , G
q
i→i+1 and G
q
i→i+1, G
q
i+1 are ε/4q-indistinguishable by an s-size
quantum adversary with ℓ-bounded quantum storage. By a hybrid argument, we have, for all s-size
quantum adversary with ℓ-bounded quantum storage,∣∣∣Pr [A(Gq0) = 1]− Pr [A(Gqq) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ q(εPrg + εExt) ≤ ε2 . (7.1)
Similarly, we can define games G˜qi (resp., G˜
q
i→i+1) with replacing Xq by X˜q at the end of the games
Gqi (resp., G
q
i→i+1) for all i. By the same argument, we also have∣∣∣Pr [A(G˜q0) = 1]− Pr [A(G˜qq) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε2 .
Note that Gqq = G˜
q
q. Combining both inequalities, we have that for all s-size quantum adversary
with ℓ-bounded quantum storage,∣∣∣Pr [A(Gq0) = 1]− Pr [A(G˜q0)]∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Pr [A(Gq0) = 1]− Pr [A(Gqq) = 1]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Pr [A(G˜q0) = 1]− Pr [A(G˜qq) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
which concludes the proof.
8 Barrier - Gap Amplification Problem
In Section 6, we have seen the leakage chain rule for quantum relaxed-HILL pseudoentropy for
ccq-states. However, the chain rule for cqq-states, where the source and prior knowledge are both
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quantum, is still unknown, and nor is the connection between the guessing pseudoentropy and HILL
pseudoentropy.
One of the main challenge in extending classical proofs from classical to quantum cases is due
to the celebrated Wootters-Zurek no-cloning theorem [WZ82]. Here we exhibit another barrier —
the gap amplification problem defined as follows. Given a quantum distinguisher A (whose input is
a quantum state ρ), where the acceptance probability is greater than p for YES instances and less
than q for NO instances, can we have another quantum distinguisher A′ where the gap p′−q′ is larger
than that in A? If we were able to clone an arbitrary quantum state, then the gap amplification
would be easy (as discussed below). Thus, we can view the gap amplification problem as a special
case of the no-cloning theorem. Moreover, we will show that the impossibility of amplifying the gap
implies that imperfect cloning of a single qubit to within a constant in trace distance is impossible.
In the classical case, the gap amplification result provides the robustness of BPP definition
in the way that no matter what the acceptance probabilities for both YES and NO instances
are, the definitions for BPP are equivalent as long as the gap is non-negligible. Similarly, in the
quantum setting, the gap amplification problem is connected to the amplification of the acceptance
probability of quantum proofs in QMA. The gap amplification problem is trivial in the classical
case, as there is no cloning restriction in the classical world. For a given input, we can make copies
of the input, run the original algorithm multiple times, and then use a majority or threshold rule
to reduce the error probability via a concentration bound (e.g., Chernoff bound). However, in the
quantum case, due to the no-cloning theorem, it is not obvious that we can do it. Note that the
no-cloning theorem does not directly imply the impossibility of amplification, but we can use the
similar concept in proving no-cloning theorem to show the impossibility of amplification. On the
other hand, the impossibility of amplification implies not only no-cloning theorem, but also the
imperfect cloning [GM97] for arbitrary states.
First, we define the gap amplification problem as follows.
Definition 8.1 (Gap-Amplification Problem). Let A : Dens
(
C
M
) → {0, 1}, 0 < q < p < 1.
We say that a quantum distinguisher A′ : Dens
(
C
M
) → {0, 1} is a (p, q)-amplified version of A if
for every input |ψ〉 ∈ Ball (CM),
Pr[A′(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = 1]
{
> p if Pr[A(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = 1] ≥ p
< q if Pr[A(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = 1] ≤ q .
Then we show that except for trivial cases, one cannot push the error rate (1− p and q for two
cases respectively) arbitrarily close to 1.
Theorem 8.2. For every real numbers 0 < q < p < 1, there exists a quantum distinguisher
A : Dens
(
C
2
)→ {0, 1} such that no (p, q)-amplified version of A (even of unbounded size) exists.
Proof. Let A be a single-qubit measurement in the computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. Consider the
pure states |ψ〉 = (cosα) |0〉 + (sinα) |1〉 and |φ〉 = (cos β) |0〉 + (sin β) |1〉, where α = sin−1(√p)
and β = sin−1(
√
q). Thus Pr[A(|ψ〉) = 1] = p and Pr[A(|φ〉) = 1] = q.
Let the BPOVM of A′ be Π =
[
a −b+ ci
−b− ci d
]
for 0 ≤ a, d ≤ 1 and appropriate real
numbers b and c such that that Π ≥ 0. Assume that A′ is a (p, q)-amplified version of A such that
〈Π, |ψ〉〈ψ|〉 > sin2 α and 〈Π, |φ〉〈φ|〉 < sin2 β. That is,
a cos2 α− 2b sinα cosα+ d sin2 α > sin2 α,
a cos2 β − 2b sin β cos β + d sin2 β < sin2 β.
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After dividing the two inequalities by sin2 α and sin2 β, respectively, we obtain
a cot2 α+ d > 1 + 2b cotα, (8.1)
a cot2 β + d < 1 + 2b cot β. (8.2)
Since d ≤ 1, we have a > 2bcotα by Equation (8.1). On the other hand, subtracting Equation (8.1)
from Equation (8.2) and dividing it by (cot β − cotα), which is positive by the choices of α and β,
we get a < 2bcotβ+cotα <
2b
cotα . That gives a contradiction.
Now we can prove the impossibility of imperfect cloning for a single qubit from Theorem 8.2.
Theorem 8.3. Let C be a quantum circuit with input space Ball
(
C
2
)
and output space Ball
(
C
22
)
.
For every 0 < ε < 0.002, there exists |ψ〉 ∈ Ball (C2) such that T (C(|ψ〉), |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉) > ε.
Proof. Suppose the statement is false. That is, for all |ψ〉 ∈ Ball (C2), we have T (C(|ψ〉), |ψ〉 ⊗
|ψ〉) < ε. Then given a quantum distinguisher A with input space Ball (C2), we define a quantum
distinguisher A′ with the same input space as follows.
1. Run C on input |ψ〉.
2. Run C ⊗ C on C(|ψ〉).
3. Run the algorithm A⊗A⊗A⊗A on C ⊗ C(C(|ψ〉)) and obtain four binary outcomes.
4. Output the majority of the four outcomes. Randomly output 0 or 1 if we have a tie vote.
We claim that A′ is a (2/3, 1/3)-amplified version of A.
T
(
C ⊗ C (C(|ψ〉)) , |ψ〉⊗4
)
≤T
(
C ⊗ C (C(|ψ〉)) , C ⊗C(|ψ〉⊗2)
)
+ T
(
(C(|ψ〉))⊗2 , |ψ〉⊗4
)
.
Note that T
(
C ⊗ C (C(|ψ〉)) , C ⊗ C(|ψ〉⊗2)
)
≤ T
(
C(|ψ〉), |ψ〉⊗2
)
< ε since a trace-preserving
quantum operation does not increase the trace distance [NC00]. On the other hand,
T (ρ⊗ ρ, σ ⊗ σ) ≤1
2
T (ρ⊗ (ρ+ σ), σ ⊗ (ρ+ σ)) + 1
2
T ((ρ+ σ)⊗ ρ, (ρ+ σ)⊗ σ)
=
1
4
Tr |(ρ− σ)⊗ (ρ+ σ)|+ 1
4
Tr |(ρ+ σ)⊗ (ρ− σ)|
=
1
2
Tr |ρ− σ|Tr |ρ+ σ| = 2T (ρ, σ).
Thus
T
(
(C(|ψ〉))⊗2 , |ψ〉⊗4
)
≤ 2T
(
C(|ψ〉), |ψ〉⊗2
)
< 2ε.
Therefore,
T
(
C ⊗ C (C(|ψ〉)) , |ψ〉⊗4
)
< 3ε.
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Suppose A(|ψ〉) ≥ 2/3 , p and A(|φ〉) ≤ 1/3 = 1− p. Then
Pr[A′(|ψ〉) = 1] > (p4 − 3ε) + 4(p3(1− p)− 3ε) + 3(p2(1− p)2 − 3ε),
Pr[A′(|φ〉) = 1] > ((1 − p)4 + 3ε) + 4((1 − p)3p+ 3ε) + 3(p2(1− p)2 + 3ε).
If we set ε = 0.002, then Pr[A′(|ψ〉) = 1] > 0.6927 and Pr[A′(|φ〉) = 1] < 0.3073. This means that
A′ is a (2/3, 1/3)-amplified version of A, which contradicts Theorem 8.2.
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A Tomography
In a quantum tomography problem, one wants to learn the behavior or even a description of a
quantum circuit or quantum state. In our applications to the MMWU proof of quantum simulation
leakage lemma, one tasks is that, given a quantum distinguisher, find a corresponding BPOVM
matrix. The task is precisely formulated in Definition A.4. Also in the min-max proof, which will
be illustrated in Appendix B, we would like to find a quantum state that maximizes the acceptance
probability of a given quantum distinguisher. This task is formulated in Definition A.6. In the
most general parameters in the tomography problems, let the dimension of input space be d and the
circuit size is s. Then the desired algorithm complexity is poly(s, log d), which is too demanding
to achieve. Fortunately, in our application, the poly(s, d) time complexity is already satisfying.
Our tomography algorithm also uses a solution to the QCkt-Value Problem (Definition A.1),
described as follows.
Definition A.1 (QCkt-Value Problem). The QCkt-Value(s, ε, γ) problem is a computational
problem defined as follows:
• Input: a description of a quantum circuit C of size s with binary output {0, 1}, and an error
parameter 0 < ε < 1.
• Task: with probability at least 1 − γ, output an estimate p˜ of the probability p = Pr [C = 1]
such that |p˜− p| ≤ ε.
Lemma A.2. There exists a uniform quantum algorithm A that solves QCkt-Value(s, ε, γ) in
time O(s log(1/γ)/ε2)).
Proof. The algorithm independently run the circuit C t times and let p˜ be the number of times
getting 1, divided by t. By Chernoff’s bound, we have
Pr [|p− p˜| > ε] < 2−Ω(tε2).
By choosing t = O(log(1/γ)/ε2), 2−tε
2 ≤ γ. Each trial takes O(s) time. Therefore, the total
running time is O(s log(1/γ)/ε2).
Remark A.3. It is worth mentioning that by using a quantum speed-up (e.g., [Mon15]), one can
improve the dependence on 1/ε quadratically, although this improvement is not crucial for our
purposes.
Definition A.4 (QCkt-Tomography Problem). The QCkt-Tomography(s, d, ε, γ) problem
is a computational problem defined as follows:
• Input: a description of a quantum circuit C : Dens (Cd) → {0, 1} of size-s, and an error
parameter 0 < ε < 1.
• Task: let Π be the corresponding BPOVM of C. Output an explicit description (as matrices)
of BPOVM Π˜ such that
∥∥∥Π− Π˜∥∥∥
op
≤ ε with probability 1− γ.
Lemma A.5. There exists a (uniform) quantum algorithm that solves the QCkt-Tomography(s, d, ε, γ)
Problem in time poly(s, d, 1/ε, log(1/γ)).
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As discussed in the preliminary, one can mathematically derive Π from the description of any
quantum circuit C (Equation (2.5)). However, this calculation is computationally heavy, e.g., in-
volving matrix operations over d · 2m dimensions, where m is the number of ancilla qubits used by
C, which can be as large as s, and thus fails to provide desired efficiency.
Proof. The strategy we use is to estimate each entry of Π, which is a d by d positive semidefinite
matrix, by feeding special input states to circuit C and observing the statistics of the output bit
(i.e., a tomography process for the POVM Π (e.g., [LFCR+09])).
Since we exploit a quantum machine to perform the circuit C and the measurement, it only
costs O(s) for a quantum machine to execute C once. The total running time then depends on the
number of executions of C for the desired efficiency.
To that end, we will leverage the following set of special input states, which form an basis for
positive semidefinite operators over the input space. Let {|1〉 , · · · , |d〉} be any orthonormal basis
in Cd. Define the following set of density operators:
∀n = 1, · · · , d, An,n = |n〉〈n| , (A.1)
∀1 ≤ n < m ≤ d, Aren,m = |ψn,m〉〈ψn,m| , |ψn,m〉 = 1√2(|n〉+ |m〉), (A.2)
∀1 ≤ n < m ≤ d, Aimn,m = |φn,m〉〈φn,m| , |φn,m〉 = 1√2(|n〉+ i |m〉). (A.3)
Also let
αn,n(Π) = Tr (An,nΠ)
αren,m(Π) = Tr
(
Aren,mΠ
)
αimn,m(Π) = Tr
(
Aimn,mΠ
)
The collection of values αn,n(Π) for n = 1, · · · , d and αren,m(Π) and αimn,m(Π) for 1 ≤ n < m ≤ d
uniquely determines any positive semidefinite operator Π.7 It suffices to collect these α values
to within small error to approximate Π. We will invoke Lemma A.2 for each α value for that
purpose. Overall, by a union bound, with probability 1 − γ, we can collect a set of α˜ values
that approximate the original α values with an additive error η in time d2 · O (s log(d/γ)/η2) =
poly(s, d, log(1/γ), 1/η). Namely, for all n,m, we have
|α˜n,n − αn,n(Π)| ≤ η, |α˜ren,m − αren,m(Π)| ≤ η, and |α˜imn,m − αimn,m(Π)| ≤ η.
We can thus solve the following semidefinite program (SDP) to recover an approximate Π˜:
Goal: find a Π˜
Subject to: |α˜n,n − αn,n(Π˜)| ≤ η,
|α˜re/imn,m − αre/imn,m (Π˜)| ≤ η,
0 ≤ Π˜ ≤ id.
7It is not hard to see that αn,n(Π) determines all the diagonal entrees. Every off-diagonal entree (n,m) (or its
conjugate at (m,n)) is then determined by α
re/im
n,m (Π) together with the information about the diagonal entree (n, n)
and (m,m).
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We claim that any feasible solution Π˜ is a good approximate of Π. This is because by definition
and the triangle inequality, all the α values of Π and Π˜ are close. Namely,
|α˜n,n(Π˜)− αn,n(Π)| ≤ 2η, |α˜ren,m(Π˜)− αren,m(Π1)| ≤ 2η, |α˜imn,m(Π˜)− αimn,m(Π)| ≤ 2η.
This implies the max norm of Π˜ − Π is small, i.e.,
∥∥∥Π˜−Π∥∥∥
max
≤ O(η). By Equation (2.4), we
have ∥∥∥Π˜−Π∥∥∥
op
≤ d
∥∥∥Π˜−Π∥∥∥
max
= O(dη).
It then suffices to choose η = O(ε/d). Overall, the above circuit succeeds with probability at least
1− γ and runs in poly(s, d, 1/ε, log(1/γ)) time.
Definition A.6 (QCkt-Max-Sat Problem). The QCkt-Max-Sat(s, d, ε, γ) problem is a com-
putational problem defined as follows:
• Input: a description of a quantum circuit C : Dens (Cd) → {0, 1} of size-s, and an error
parameter 0 < ε < 1.
• Task: Output an explicit description (as a density matrix) of a quantum state ρ ∈ Dens (Cd)
such that C(ρ) > maxσ C(σ)− ε with probability 1− γ.
Theorem A.7. There exists a (uniform) quantum algorithm A that solves QCkt-Max-Sat(s, d, ε, γ)
problem in time poly(s, d, 1/ε, log(1/γ)).
Proof. This theorem follows from Lemma A.5 and an application of a spectrum decomposition.
Let Π be the corresponding BPOVM of C. By Lemma A.5, there exists an circuit A that runs
in time poly(s, d, 1/ε, log(1/γ)) and outputs a description of Π˜ such that
∥∥∥Π˜−Π∥∥∥
op
≤ ε/2 with
probability 1− γ. That means for all τ ∈ Dens (Cd),∣∣∣〈Π˜, τ〉 − 〈Π, τ〉∣∣∣ ≤ ε/2. (A.4)
We then run a spectrum decomposition on Π˜ and choose ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| to be the density operator
corresponding to the eigenvector |ψ〉 with the largest eigenvalue of Π˜. This step can be done in
poly(d) given that dimension of Π˜ is d (e.g., by SDP). Thus, we have〈
Π˜, ρ
〉
≥ max
σ
〈
Π˜, σ
〉
. (A.5)
By Equation (A.4), we have
〈Π, ρ〉 ≥
〈
Π˜, ρ
〉
− ε/2
≥ max
σ
〈
Π˜, σ
〉
− ε/2
≥ max
σ
〈Π, σ〉 − ε/2− ε/2
= max
σ
〈Π, σ〉 − ε.
The overall complexity is poly(s, d, 1/ε, log(1/γ)), which completes the proof.
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B Leakage Simulation Lemma by Quantum Min-Max Theorem
In this section, we provide another proof of the Leakage Simulation Lemma via the nonuniform
quantum min-max theorem. First, we introduce two techniques required in this proof – epsilon-net
and quantum sampling lemma. Then we prove the leakage simulation lemma, which can lead to
the Leakage Chain Rule as shown in Section 6.1.
B.1 Epsilon-nets for Quantum States and BPOVM.
An epsilon-net (or ε-net) of a certain set X is meant to be an approximation of every point in X
with “error” at most ε by a collection of discrete points. Suppose X is a set with a metric ∆(·, ·). A
subset N (X, ε) is an ε-net of X if for each x ∈ X, there exists y ∈ N (X, ε) such that ∆(x, y) ≤ ε.
We are interested in ε-nets of (1) the set of pure d-dimensional quantum states with respect to the
trace distance and (2) the set of BPOVMs with respect to the operator norm.
Proposition B.1 (e.g., [Ver12]). For every 0 < ε < 0.01 and d ∈ N, there is an ε-net N (Ball (Cd) , ε)
of the complex d-dimensional unit sphere (which we view as the set of pure quantum states) with
respect to the Euclidean norm such that the size of N (Ball (Cd) , ε) is bounded by (1/ε)O(d). More-
over, for any pure state |ψ〉 ∈ Ball (Cd), there exists |φ〉 ∈ N (Ball (Cd, ε)) with ε < 0.01 such that
for every quantum circuit C with binary output, we have∣∣∣E [C(|ψ〉〈ψ|)]− E [C(|φ〉〈φ|)]∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε.
The set of all BPOVMs on a d-dimension system is denoted by Γ
(
C
d
)
. Namely, Γ
(
C
d
)
consists
of all Hermitian operator Π such that 0 ≤ Π ≤ idd and 0 ≤ idd −Π ≤ idd.
Proposition B.2 (e.g., [SW15]). For every 0 < ε < 12 and d ∈ N, there is an ε-net N
(
Γ
(
C
d
)
, ε
)
of d-dimensional BPOVMs with respect to the operator norm such that the size of N (Γ (Cd) , ε) is
bounded by (1/ε)O(d
2). Moreover, for every quantum circuit C with d-dimension input and binary
output, there exists a quantum circuit C ′ with BPOVM in N (Γ (Cd) , ε) such that for all quantum
states ρ ∈ Dens (Cd), we have ∣∣∣E [C(ρ)]− E [C ′(ρ)]∣∣∣ < ε.
B.2 Derandomization via Sampling
The derandomization lemma says that for every distribution of circuits, there is a “small” circuit to
approximate the distribution such a given set of functions cannot tell the difference. In the classical
case, it has been used to prove many results, such as Impagliazzo’s Hardcore Lemma [Imp95], the
nonuniform min-max theorem, Regularity Lemma [TTV09] and Dense Model Theorem [RTTV08].
This technique was formally defined as Lemma 3 of [CLP15]. Herein we generalize it to allow
circuits with quantum inputs and outputs, and use the epsilon-net method to handle the fact that
there are infinitely many quantum states in a state space.
Lemma B.3. Let X be a finite space with |X| = dX and Y be a Hilbert space with dimension dY .
Let C be a distribution over C, a class of quantum circuits with input space X and output space
Dens (Y).Then for every ε ∈ (0, 1/2), there exists a quantum distinguisher Ĉ with complexity8 O(t)
with respect to C such that
8A circuit Ĉ has complexity O(t) with respect to C if Ĉ is composed of O(t) circuits in C and O(t) universal gates.
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1) For all x ∈ X and a distinguisher D : X ×Dens (Y)→ {0, 1},∣∣∣∣ E
C←C
[D(x,C(x))] − E
[
D(x, Ĉ(x))
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
and 2) t = O
(
1
ε2
(log dX + d
2
Y log(1/ε))
)
.
Proof. We sample a set of t circuits C1, . . . , Ct from the distribution C and let Ĉ be a circuit that
randomly chooses one of {C1, . . . , Ct} to run. Then for every x ∈ X,
E
C←C
[C(x, ρ)] = E
Ĉ←C
[
Ĉ(x, ρ)
]
=
1
t
t∑
i=1
E [Ci(x, ρ)] .
For every x ∈ X and a distinguisher D, by Chernoff bound, we have
Pr
Ĉ←C
[∣∣∣∣ E
C←C
[D(x,C(x))]− E
Ĉ
[
D(x, Ĉ(x))
]∣∣∣∣ > ε2
]
≤ 2−tε2/16. (B.1)
Recall that a quantum distinguisher with input in Dens
(
CN
)
can be represented by a N by N
BPOVM matrix. If we denote the BPOVM of the distinguisherD(x, ·) by Πx, then the distinguisher
D by a set of BPOVM {Πx}x∈X . Particularly, D(x, ρ) = 〈Πx, ρ〉. Thus, Equation (B.1) can be
written as
Pr
Ĉ←C
[∣∣∣∣ E
C←C
[〈Πx, C(x)〉]− E
Ĉ
[〈
Πx, Ĉ(x)
〉]∣∣∣∣ > ε2
]
≤ 2−tε2/16. (B.2)
Apply the union bound to Equation (B.1) over every x ∈ X and Πx ∈ N (Γ (Y) , ε/2), then
Pr
Ĉ←C
[
∀x ∈ X,Πx ∈ N (Γ (Y) , ε/2) ,
∣∣∣∣ E
C←C
[〈x,C(x)〉]− E
Ĉ
[〈
x, Ĉ(x)
〉]∣∣∣∣ > ε2
]
≤|X| · |N (Γ (Y) , ε/2) | · 2−tε2/16.
Since |N (Γ (Y) , ε/2)| = (1/ε)O(d2Y ), we can choose t = O ( 1
ε2
(log dX + d
2
Y log(1/ε))
)
such that the
quantity on the right-hand side of the inequality is less than one. That implies there exists a choice
of t circuits C1, . . . , Ct to form the circuit Ĉ such that for all x ∈ X and Πx ∈ N (Γ (Y) , ε/2), Ĉ and
the expectation of C are ε/2-close measured by Πx. Apply Proposition B.2, we can extend the above
statement from a BPOVM in the net to any BPOVM (or equivalently, any quantum distinguisher)
by losing another ε/2. Namely, we have that there exists a choice of t circuits {C1, . . . , Ct} to form
the circuit Ĉ such that
∀x ∈ X,D(x, ·) ,
∣∣∣∣ E
C←C
[D(x,C(x))]− E
Ĉ
[
D(x, Ĉ(x))
]∣∣∣∣ > ε2 + ε2 = ε.
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B.3 Leakage Simulation Lemma
Theorem 6.1. Let ρXB =
∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB ∈ {0, 1}n × Dens
(
C
2ℓ
)
be a cq-state with n
classical bits and ℓ qubits. For any s ∈ N and ε > 0, there exists a quantum circuit C : {0, 1}n →
Dens
(
C
2ℓ
)
of size s′ = poly(s, n, 2ℓ, 1/ε) such that the cq-state
∑
x∈{0,1}n px |x〉〈x|⊗C(x) and ρXB
are (s, ε)-indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that for all size-s′ quantum circuit C : {0, 1}n → Dens
(
C
2ℓ
)
,
there exists a quantum distinguisher D : {0, 1}n ×Dens
(
C
2ℓ
)
→ {0, 1} of size s such that
E [D(ρXB)]− E [D(X,C(X))] ≥ ε.
First we transform circuits of bounded size to distributions of circuits of bounded size via the
following claim.
Claim 9. For every distribution C over size-s′′ quantum circuit with s′ = s′′ ·O((n+22ℓ)/ε2), there
exists a distinguisher D of size s such that E [D(ρXB)]− EC∼C [D(X,C(X))] < ε/2.
proof of Claim 9. Suppose that there exists a distribution C over size-s′′ circuit such that for all
size-s distinguisher D,
E [D(ρXB)]− E
C∼C
[D(X,C(X))] < ε/2.
Apply Lemma B.3 with dX = 2
n and dY = 2
ℓ, then there exists a circuit Ĉ of size s′ = s′′ ·
O((n + 22ℓ)/ε2) such that E [D(ρXB)] − E
[
D(X, Ĉ(X))
]
< ε/2 + ε/2 = ε which contradict the
assumption.
Once we have Claim 9, we apply the nonuniform Quantum Min-Max Theorem (Theorem 4.1)
using the following parameters. The strategy space of Player 1 is
A =
{
cq-state
∑
x
px |x〉〈x| ⊗C(x)
∣∣∣∣∣C : {0, 1}n → Dens(C2ℓ) is a quantum circuit of size s′′
}
,
and the strategy space of Player 2 B is the set of all distinguishers with size at most s. The mapping
f is defined to be
f(D) = E[D(ρXB)]idn+ℓ +ΠD.
where ΠD is the BPOVM of D. By the Quantum Min-Max Theorem, we know there exists a
quantum distinguisher D˜ of size s · O ( 1ε2 (n+ ℓ)) such that for all for all s′′-size circuit C˜,
E
[
D˜(ρXB)
]
− E
[
D˜(X, C˜(X))
]
> ε/4. (B.3)
Express the BPOVM of D˜(x, ·) to be Πx for x ∈ {0, 1}n, then we have
E
[
D˜(ρXB)
]
=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
px 〈Πx, ρxB〉 .
Now, define the quantum circuit C is as follows:
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1. For input x ∈ {0, 1}n, apply Lemma A.7 to solve the (s, ℓ, ε/8, ε/8)-QCkt-Max-Sat Problem
with the quantum circuit D˜(x, ·) to get a description of the quantum state σx such that with
probability 1− ε/8,
〈Πx, σx〉 ≥ max
ρ
〈Πx, ρ〉 − ε/8.
2. Construct the quantum state σx and output it.
The state can be constructed from its description by a circuit of size polynomial in its description
length and dimension [SBM05]. So the running time of C is poly(s, n, 2ℓ, 1/ε). Eventually, we have
E
[
D˜(X,C(X))
]
=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
px 〈Πx, σx〉 ≥
(
1− ε
8
) ∑
x∈{0,1}n
pxmax
ρ
〈Πx, ρ〉 − ε
8

≥
(
1− ε
8
)(
max
C′
E
[
D˜(X,C ′(X))
]
− ε
8
)
≥max
C′
E
[
D˜(X,C ′(X))
]
− ε
4
.
which contradicts Equation (B.3).
C Proof of MMWU Theorem via KL-projection
In this section, we proof the MMWU Theorem considering the setting in Section 4.1 and Proce-
dure 4.1.
First, we have the following facts and lemmas.
Fact 1. For x < 1, − ln(1− x) ≥ x+ x2/2 + x3/3; for X
Fact 2. If B > C, then Tr (AB) > Tr (AC).
Lemma C.1. Let Y ∈ Dens (H) and A be a convex set in Y ∈ Dens (H). Let Y ∗ be a KL-projection
of Y on A, then
D (X‖Y ∗) +D (Y ∗‖Y ) ≤ D (X‖Y )
Particularly, due to the non-negativity of the KL-divergence,
D (X‖Y ∗) ≤ D (X‖Y )
Proof. Let
Zλ = λX + (1− λ)Y ∗.
Since A is convex, Zλ ∈ A for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Because the minimum of D (Zλ‖Y ) happens at λ = 0,
the derivative of D (Zλ‖Y ) is nonnegative at λ = 0.
d
dλ
D (Zλ‖Y ) = d
dλ
Tr (Zλ logZλ)− Tr (Zλ log Y )
=Tr
(
dZλ
dλ
logZλ
)
+Tr
(
Zλ
d logZλ
dλ
)
− Tr
(
dZλ
dλ
· log Y
)
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It is straightforward to have dZλdλ = X − Y ∗. For Tr
(
Zλ
d logZλ
dλ
)
,
Tr
(
Zλ
d logZλ
dλ
)
=Tr
(
Zλ
d
dλ
( ∞∑
n=1
−(−1)
n
n
(Zλ − id)n
))
=Tr
(
Zλ
∞∑
n=1
−(−1)
n
n
n−1∑
i=0
(Zλ − id)i · dZλ
dλ
· (Zλ − id)n−1−i
)
=
∞∑
n=1
−(−1)
n
n
n−1∑
i=0
Tr
(
Zλ(Zλ − id)i · (X − Y ∗) · (Zλ − id)n−1−i
)
(a)
=
∞∑
n=1
−(−1)
n
n
n−1∑
i=0
Tr
(
Zλ(Zλ − id)n−1 · (X − Y ∗)
)
=Tr
(
Zλ
∞∑
n=1
−(−1)
n
n
n−1∑
i=0
(X − Y ∗)
)
=Tr
(
ZλZ
−1
λ (X − Y ∗)
)
= Tr (X − Y ∗) = 0,
where the equality (a) is due to the commutativity between Zλ and (Zλ − id), and the invariance
of trace under cyclic permutations. Therefore,
d
dλ
D (Zλ‖Y )
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
= Tr ((X − Y ∗) logZλ)− Tr ((X − Y ∗) · log Y )|λ=0
=Tr ((X − Y ∗) log Y ∗)− Tr ((X − Y ∗) · log Y )
=Tr (X(logX − log Y ))− Tr (X(logX − log Y ∗))−Tr (Y ∗(log Y ∗ − log Y ))
=D (X‖Y )−D (X‖Y ∗)−D (Y ∗‖Y ) ≥ 0,
which yields the conclusion by an rearrangement.
Lemma C.2. Consider the setting in Section 4.1 and Procedure 4.1. We have for all a ∈ A,
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
a(t), f(b(t))
〉
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
a, f(b(t))
〉
+
(
η +
log d
ηT
)
.
Proof. Let L(t) = f(bt). First, recall the definition of relative entropy (KL-divergence) of two
quantum states ρ, σ:
D (ρ‖σ) = Tr (ρ(log ρ− log σ)) .
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For any density matrix a,
D
(
a
∥∥∥a(t))−D (a∥∥∥a(t+1)′′)
=− Tr
(
a log a(t)
)
+Tr
(
a log a(t+1)
′′
)
)
=− Tr
(
a
(
log a(t)
)
+Tr
(
a log
(
exp(log a(t) − ηL(t))
Tr
(
exp(log a(t) − ηL(t)))
)))
=− Tr
(
a log a(t)
)
+Tr
(
a log a(t)
)
+Tr
(
−ηaL(t))
)
− log
(
Tr
(
exp(log a(t) − ηL(t))
))
(a)
≥ Tr
(
−ηaL(t))
)
− log
(
Tr
(
a(t) exp(−ηL(t))
))
=− η 〈a, Lt〉− log (Tr (a(t)(idd − (idd − exp(−ηL(t))))))
=− η 〈a, Lt〉− log (Tr (a(t))− Tr (a(t)(idd − exp(−ηL(t)))))
=− η 〈a, Lt〉− log (1− Tr (a(t)(idd − exp(−ηL(t)))))
(b)
≥ − η 〈a, Lt〉+Tr (a(t)(idd − exp(−ηL(t))))
(c)
≥ − η 〈a, Lt〉+Tr (a(t)(idd − idd + ηL(t) − (ηL(t))2))
=η
〈
a(t), Lt
〉
− η 〈a, Lt〉− η2.
Inequality (a) is due to the Golden-Thompson inequality. For the inequality (b), notice that
0 < ηL(t) < idd, then 0 < idd − exp(−ηL(t)) < Id, so by Fact 2, Tr
(
a(t)(idd − exp(−ηL(t)))
)
<
Tr
(
a(t)Id
)
= 1. Finally, applying Fact 1, we get the inequality. For the inequality (c), it is due to
the definition of an exponential of a matrix and Fact 1.
Since a(t+1) is the KL-projection of a(t+1)
′′
, by Lemma C.1, we have
D
(
a
∥∥∥a(t+1)) ≤ D (a∥∥∥a(t+1)′′) ,
and so
D
(
a
∥∥∥a(t))−D (a∥∥∥a(t+1)) ≥D (a∥∥∥a(t))−D (a∥∥∥a(t+1)′′)
≥η
〈
a(t), Lt
〉
− η 〈a, Lt〉− η2
Now we do the telescoping from t = 1 through t = T , we get
D
(
a
∥∥∥a(1))−D (a∥∥∥a(T+1)) ≥ η T∑
t=1
〈
a(t), Lt
〉
−
T∑
t=1
η
〈
a, Lt
〉− Tη2
Since KL-divergence is always non-negative and when a(1) = 1d idd, D
(
a
∥∥a(1)) = log d−H(a) where
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H is the von Neumann entropy, we have
log d ≥ η
T∑
t=1
〈
a(t), Lt
〉
−
T∑
t=1
η
〈
a, Lt
〉− Tη2
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
a(t), Lt
〉
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈
a, Lt
〉
+ η +
log d
ηT
.
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